but played the lead role. In respect of planning and direction, the real power in the Soviet system resided in the Central Committee departments. One of the two or three most important departments was the Administrative Organs Department, which was the centre for planning and control of drug operations in both the Soviet Union and in Czechoslo- vakia. This was probably the case in the other satellites as well.
The Administrative Organs Department exercised control and oversight over the intelligence services, the military and (socialist) justice. Thus, it was only natural that the Administrative Organs Department would be the lead Central Committee department in respect of drug operations. It was no mere coincidence that when Khrushchev wanted the drugs offensive to be intensified in 1963, he called upon General Major Nikolai Savinkin, the Deputy Head of the Administrative Organs Department, to visit all participating countries and issue comprehensive instructions. Western analysts might well be advised to pay increased attention to the role of the Party and of the powerful Central Committee Departments, especially the Administrative Organs Department. In this regard, it is important to recognise that Savinkin became head of the Administrative Organs Department in 1964, running it until his retirement in 1987, twenty-three years later. (It was not until 1988 that the Soviet press announced that he had stepped down as head of the department).
Within the Administrative Organs Department there were officials whose responsi- bilities were, in effect, to watch over the military and intelligence organisations. Also, political officers were located within the military and intelligence organisations who, in addition, were members of the appropriate sections of the Administrative Organs Department and who kept their respective section chiefs informed on what was happen- ing in their areas of responsibility within the military or intelligence services. For example, Sejna was the highest ranking political officer at the Czechoslovak Ministry of Defence and, as such, he was also a member of the military section of the Administrative Organs Department. Additionally, in the case of specially coordinated operations (such as drug- trafficking), important departments often had special coordination and control functions not only with respect to their normal responsibilities - for example, over the military and intelligence organisations in the case of the Administrative Organs Department - but over other participating organisations as well.
Another organisation of importance in maintaining control and internal security was counter-intelligence. In the headquarters of (Czechoslovak) military intelligence (Zs), there was a section of military counter-intelligence, which was really a section of the Ministry of Interior (KGB in the Soviet Union) and which also had a responsible control- ling official in the Administrative Organs Department.
Also, within both civilian and military counter-intelligence, there were special departments that watched over the counter-intelligence operations and reported on them
to the head of the Administrative Organs Department. The Soviets trust nobody, and their organisational structure has always reflected this principle. Everyone is controlled three ways. This is one reason why, when several officials from Cuba, Nicaragua, Bulgaria, or from some other Communist state, were found to be involved in drug-trafficking, it was always highly unlikely that these were 'just a few corrupt officials'. The Party was almost
certainly well aware of what they were doing, and in fact not only approved of the
operation but probably directed it to be carried out.
Indicative of the Party's oversight and discipline in drug operations was the fact that in 1959 the Chief of the Czechoslovak Zs, General Racek, was fired following an
inspection by the Administrative Organs Department official who was in charge of Zs and military counter-intelligence. In his report, he criticised General Racek for not putting the best people into the drug business. Racek had failed to recognise how important the drug business would be for intelligence operations.
Both civilian and military intelligence had narcotics responsibilities. However, because production was controlled by and within the military and because the military was responsible for destroying the ability of an enemy population to support a war effort, primary responsibility for drug-trafficking resided within the military establishment. Civilian intelligence (the Second Administration in Czechoslovakia, the intelligence com- ponent3 within the KGB in the Soviet Union) assisted whenever their resources were better suited to the task and where military intelligence, Zs in Czechoslovakia, did not have opportunities for trafficking in drugs.
Most of the narcotics agent operations were handled within the strategic intelligence sections of the civilian and military intelligence organisations. Agent recruitment, training, and administration were handled by the agent networks branch, but the narcotics operation was run by the strategic intelligence branch. This branch was responsible for establishing production quotas in respect of drugs produced in Czechoslovakia and for coordinating and directing overseas (local) drug production; for coordinating transportation; for managing agent operations; and for overall foreign operations planning.
Counter-intelligence and military counter-intelligence, the business of which is
security, were also involved. Their mission was particularly complicated in overseas operations and required the assistance of foreign Communist Parties and strategic intelli- gence agents operating within the country of interest. Financial records, budgeting, and bookkeeping were handled by special finance sections within each intelligence service.
In the case of Cuba, both the Zs and the Second Administration (and Soviet GRU and KGB intelligence) helped to set up the relevant drugs operation. It was a joint venture from the outset. As explained earlier, when Raul Castro was in Czechoslovakia in the summer of
1960, he signed assistance agreements with both the Minister of Interior and the Minister of Defence. When plans for expanding the drug operations or reporting on past progress were presented to the Czechoslovak Defence Council, the presentations were made jointly by the Ministries of Defence and Interior.
Between the Ministries of Defence and Interior there was a joint committee which
coordinated intelligence operations. This committee decided who would run recruited agents, who would run a particular operation (civilian or military), who could work best in different regions, and so forth. In Czechoslovakia, the co-chairmen of the committee were the First Deputy Minister of Interior and the Chief of the General Staff. Other members were the Chief of Zs and the Chief of the Second Administration in the Ministry of Interior (chief of intelligence in the KGB in the Soviet Union), and their deputies in charge of strategic intelligence. In planning an operation, this committee in the Soviet Union first decided which satellites could do the job most effectively and, within each satellite, which intelligence service, civilian or military, had the best opportunity to do so.
In the late 1950s, a number of particularly important organisations were formed which were given critical responsibilities: the Departments of Special Propaganda in the
Intelligence Administrations of the General Staffs. These departments reported jointly to the
Intelligence Administration and to the Main Political Administration. They played especially important roles in collecting data on individuals in foreign countries and in controlling such individuals in time of war. Narcotics strategy, especially that element
associated with the gathering of information on associated corruption, was closely coupled with the mission of the Departments of Special Propaganda. These departments also had important roles in deception and deception planning, and were often the principal agencies issuing such instructions.
Propaganda was run by the Central Committee's Department for Propaganda and the Departments of Special Propaganda. A special person (a special section in the Soviet Union) at the Administrative Organs Department provided intelligence data derived from the intel- ligence services and from the Department of Special Propaganda, and issued directions (orders) for the propaganda offensive. In the case of deception operations, again many organisations were involved - the most important of which were the Main Political Admin-
istration, the Department of Special Propaganda, the Foreign (International) Department, the
strategic intelligence sections of both military and civilian intelligence, and the Elected
Secretariat4, which was responsible for the oversight of most deception operations.
Both East European and Soviet scientists participated heavily in military and intelli- gence R&D, including the development, production, and analysis of the consequences of drug and narcotics usage. In Czechoslovakia, the main research activities in support of narcotics trafficking were handled by the Academy of Sciences and by the military research centres. In the Academy, the primary activities were conducted at the Charles Medical University and at the Medical College at Bratislava. In the military, the primary focus or direction was provided by the Military Health Administration, with the work performed in the Central Military Hospital - the Military Medical Education Centre where doctors were trained - and the Air Force Medical Centre.
The Academy of Sciences' activities were governed by one-year, five-year and long- term (fifteen years and beyond) plans consisted of two parts, a regular part and a Top Secret element. The participants involved in putting together the Top Secret part outside the Academy of Sciences were the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee, the Health Department of the Central Committee, the Military Administration at the State Plan Commission, the Science Administration at the Ministry of Defence, the
strategic intelligence section at the Ministry of Interior, the General Staff (Zs), and the
military section of the Finance Department of the Central Committee.
Plans and objectives for research and development of improved drugs and narcotics (that is to say, drugs which would be more rapidly addictive, easier to manufacture, and which would offer 'improved' long-term debilitating mental effects)5 were contained in the top secret segment of the plans, along with development plans for biological and chemical warfare agents, special chemicals for assassinations, and mind-control (behaviour modifica- tion) drugs. As indicated earlier, drugs and narcotics were regarded as chemical weapons.
Analysis of the effects of drug and narcotics trafficking - that is, market analysis -was an especially important Soviet Bloc activity. The most important analysis centres were the Military Political Academy of the Main Political Administration, the Highest Party School and the Academy of Sciences. At the Military Political Academy, the focus was on the military perspective, of course. The Highest Party School granted PhDs in a wide variety of subjects, including both physical and social sciences. Normally sixty percent of the schooling consisted of Marxism-Leninism and forty percent focused on the student's field of specialisation; for example, biology. These institutes were convenient locations for analytical programs because they were separately funded, had ready access to libraries and also had access to research facilities. The principal research was conducted by the faculty.
There were also joint research teams, the members of which came from all the Soviet
Bloc countries. These were usually directed by the Soviet participant, and in many cases the entire team was located at one of the universities or hospitals in Moscow. Over the years the tendency was towards integration of Soviet Bloc research with increased emphasis on research teams housed in Moscow, probably reflecting the then-KGB chief Yuriy Andropov's interests in maintaining tight control over special activities. As will subsequently be described, research activity on drugs during the 1960s was effective in producing drugs which were intended to limit intellectual development. All Warsaw Pact countries were involved in this research. Cuba was also involved and indirectly attached to the Warsaw Pact research through Czechoslovakia with effect from 1967 onwards.
The Soviet Bloc's intelligence services also had special agents scattered around the world, but concentrated in Europe and the Western Hemisphere, who were not involved in drug-trafficking per se, but who observed its effects. General Sejna recalls a special training session for such individuals which was held at the Zs drug-trafficking training centre at Bratislava. The focus of the session's activities was to analyse market opportunities, to recommend measures which would mislead local and national authorities about the dis- tribution of drugs, and to identify vulnerabilities in police organisations and, in particular, opportunities to corrupt or compromise police. Individuals who attended this special training session worked for either military or for civilian intelligence. They were not all Communists. But they were, as General Sejna observed, all very intelligent. One individual was a Canadian university professor.
These special studies were an especially important dimension of Soviet operations. The study activities were not one-shot, ad hoc studies, although such activities may be conducted from time to time. The main emphasis was placed on continuing activity involving the scientists, medical doctors, propagandists and intelligence specialists of several Soviet Bloc countries. They continuously examined developing tendencies around the world, as they would say, and identified new marketing opportunities and techniques. As part of Soviet directions to the satellites, specific points-of-contact were established to ensure that satellite intelligence and propaganda operations were kept informed of the conclusions arising from market analysis. This was necessary to ensure that the best possible ideas on global vulnerabilities and drug-trafficking techniques were being employed in 'Druzhba Narodov'.
Under the Soviet Bloc's COMECON economic coordination organisation, there was a Health Section and under that, a military health subsection. The members of that subsection were all the military chiefs of Health Administrations in the Warsaw Pact countries and, for the Soviets, the chief of the Main Health Administration. This group helped coordinate research and production of drugs and narcotics throughout the Warsaw Pact. COMECON, like other Soviet organisations, was not a simple economic cooperation organisation. It also served as a cover for a total military command structure designed to take command of Warsaw Pact forces should the Warsaw Pact be 'dissolved'. This arrangement was designed to enable the Soviets to recommend that both NATO and the Warsaw Pact be dissolved in the interests of peace, without such action having an appreciable impact on Soviet Bloc military capabilities.
The centre for planning production and distribution of drugs and narcotics was the Main Health Administration of the Rear Services in the Soviet Union. In Czechoslovakia, the centre was located within the Health Administration under the Rear Services.
Distribution and transportation were managed by the Main Technical Administration at the Ministry of Foreign Trade. This administration was one of the most important organ-
isations in both narcotics and terrorist operations. It was responsible for transporting and
storing weapons, explosives and narcotics. The administration was heavily staffed by Zs officers. The organisations it controlled included trade bodies involved in transportation -for example, COBOL, CHEMEPOL and AEROFLOT Logically, KINTEX, or its evident successor in Bulgaria, GLOBUS, almost certainly came under this administration.
The Main Technical Administration was given authority by the Defence Council to contract with foreign organisations for assistance where agreements were required, such as in the training of terrorists and others involved in sabotage and revolutionary war activities. This administration was, in effect, a cut-out organisation for strategic intelligence operations. It made the contracts and collected the monies. The administration was staffed mainly by Zs officers. The counterpart organisation in the General Staff was the Department of Technical Support for Foreign Countries, which coordinated the provision of weapons, explosives, terrorist supplies, etc. for shipment with the Main Technical Administration.
Within the satellites there were also Soviet intelligence stations, often located on the borders: in Czechoslovakia, for example, at Karlovy Vary, Liberec, Doupov, Cerchov and Bratislava. These stations acted beyond host country control or knowledge. When called upon to assist, the host would cooperate. The stations would engage in strategic intelli- gence operations, such as drug trafficking, without the host country's knowledge.
Illegal movement of goods across borders was maintained in peacetime so that sabo- tage agents could be moved in a similar manner during a crisis situation, without attracting undue attention. In this connection, it is useful to recall that all these operations -narcotics trafficking, military aid to terrorists, and sabotage - were handled by the strategic intelligence organisation within both military and civilian intelligence.
The Soviet Bloc negotiated a TIR (Transports Internationals Routiers) system with the West Europeans, to simplify customs and facilitate trade. Under this regime, in the country of departure, the customs officer seals the freight and signs the customs documents. Then the truck can be driven across all European frontiers. Customs inspectors are not allowed to examine the contents unless there are concrete indications that the seals or freight documents have been tampered with. This system began functioning in the late 1940s and expanded dramatically after 1949, with the greatest increase being the Soviet and East European share. By the 1970s, the Soviet Bloc's share of TIR transportation had risen to thirty percent. By the mid-1980s, it had increased to over fifty percent. This system is used to transport narcotics and terrorist supplies.
The TIR system also prevents Western officials from observing the shipments as they are transferred to other transportation means - such as ships, the preferred alternative. Czechoslovakia and other satellites rented part of Hamburg harbour. This segment of the harbour was treated as though it were Czechoslovak territory (or the territories of the other states concerned). The operations and facilities there were controlled by the Main Technical Administration of the Ministry of Foreign Trade. The Czechoslovaks paid rent to the Germans and the Czechoslovak ships used the docking and transportation links for shipping, including the shipment of materials for strategic intelligence operations, such as drugs and weapons for terrorism and sabotage, without any German interference or con- trol, or customs. Large trucks were loaded in Czechoslovakia and sealed. They were then driven across Germany to the harbour. In the course of their journey, the trucks dropped off messages and packages, and passed by military installations. Despite the fact they were usually followed by German intelligence, the German authorities could do nothing because these arrangements were provided for in a German-Czechoslovak agreement. The satellites made full use of the Hamburg port, rather than of other available facilities