CHAPTER FOUR 37
KHRUSHCHEV INSTRUCTS THE SATELLITES
In 1962, Khrushchev formally extended the Soviet narcotics operation to the East European satellites. The strategic leaders (First Secretaries, Premier Ministers, Ministers of Defence, Chiefs of General Staff, and special assistants) of the satellites were summoned to attend a secret meeting in Moscow to discuss negative developments in the socialist economies. Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia were not present. Sejna was one of the officials in attendance. High-level Soviet officials attending the meeting included Nikita Khrushchev, Leonid Brezhnev, Mikhail Suslov and Andrei Kirilenko. It was at this meeting that Khrushchev formally laid out the Soviet strategy. Mao Tse-tung and the Chinese were smart, he began, referring to the drug business. They were also more imaginative and operative. Why should we let the Chinese have a free hand in this world market, he asked, and then he answered his own question. The Chinese were good, but the Soviet Bloc intelligence services had a much superior organisation and should move as fast as possible to use drugs and narcotics both to cripple capitalist society and to finance more revolutionary activities. Khrushchev then discussed the many benefits to be derived from this business. It would provide a nice income and be a source of much-needed foreign exchange to finance intelligence operations. It would undermine the health and morale of American service- men. Because people on drugs would be undependable in crises or emergencies, the drug
business would 'weaken the human factor in the defence situation'.
Khrushchev dealt with the impact on education at length. American schools were high-priority targets, because this was where the future leaders of the bourgeoisie were to be found. Another high priority target Khrushchev identified was the American work ethic, pride and loyalty, all of which would be undermined through drugs. Finally, drugs and narcotics would lead to a decrease in the influence of religions and, he added, under certain conditions, could be used to create chaos.
'When we discussed this strategy', Khrushchev concluded, 'there were some who were concerned that this operation might be immoral. But we must state categorically', he stressed, 'that anything that speeds the destruction of capitalism is moral' [= Lenin - Ed.].
Only a few questions were raised by those attending the meeting. Janos Kadar, the
First Secretary from Hungary, expressed concern that the drug operation should not inter- fere with the progress that had been achieved under peaceful coexistence. He was referring to the economic and technical assistance that had begun flowing in from the West. Accordingly he suggested that Third World countries that were not regarded with suspi- cion by the United States should be used to run the operations.
This, indeed, has been one of the techniques employed to maintain a safe distance between the Soviet Bloc countries and the actual running of narcotics operations. Throughout Latin America, for example, while Soviet Bloc intelligence agents exercise overall control and direction, indigenous personnel are heavily relied upon to run the actual operations. This technique can also be seen in respect of operations within the Soviet Bloc that have been designed to service Western Europe. For example, the US Drug
Enforcement Agency prepared a summary report on the role of Bulgaria in international
narcotics trafficking in 1984 for Congressional hearings'. A variety of sources, all consis- tent, were referenced in the report, which covered the 1970-84 time period.
One organisation highlighted in the DEA report was KINTEX, a Bulgarian export- import firm established in 1968. KINTEX was managed by the Bulgarian secret police and acted 'on secret orders from Moscow'2. KINTEX was established, according to DEA sources, mainly to provide a mechanism for using foreign nationals inside Bulgaria to manufacture and ship narcotics to Western Europe and munitions to the Near East. The foreign operatives were Turkish, Syrian and Jordanian nationals. Coordination meetings included traffickers from Greece, Italy, Iraq and Iran. While Bulgaria was identified in the early
1970s in a classified CIA study as being a 'new centre for directing narcotics and arms trafficking'3, all the data in the DEA report on people actually handling drugs refers to foreigners operating inside Bulgaria. The Bulgarian Government's response to US com- plaints was to deny any involvement: the presence of foreign nationals on their soil consti- tuted no crime and no Bulgarian nationals either inside or outside Bulgarian territory have been implicated4.
Another leader to speak at the Moscow meeting was Walter Ulbricht, the First Secre- tary from the German Democratic Republic. He used the occasion to press for greater Ger- man participation. At that time, the Germans did not have a charter to conduct strategic intelligence and therefore, Ulbricht stressed, Germany would require assistance to exploit its resources in Africa, the Middle East, and Latin America. Strategic intelligence, which includes sabotage, terrorism, deception and espionage, was where the narcotics offensive originated and had its home. By 1964, East Germany had been granted permission to begin strategic intelligence operations.
Later in the day over drinks, Khrushchev nudged Sejna playfully with his elbow and, with a gleam in his eye, he revealed the secret name of the Soviet drug-trafficking operation, 'Druzhba Narodov' - which, roughly translated, means 'Friendship of Nations'. The clever cover name with its deceptive play on words was pure Khrushchev.
This meeting in Moscow was a unique event. The Soviet narcotics strategy was con- sidered exceedingly sensitive and was assigned the highest security classification. People
without an absolute need-to-know would not be told about the operation. Following the
meeting, which was the official beginning of the operation, with very few exceptions all coordination and cooperation were handled on a bilateral basis.
The satellite leaders returned to their respective countries and proceeded to develop their individual plans amid the tightest secrecy. Sejna has described the manner in which the Czechoslovak plans were developed, briefed to the Defence Council, approved, and
CHAPTER 4: Khrushchev Instructs the Satellites 39
then implemented. This description provides especially an interesting insight into the man- ner in which very sensitive operational plans were developed, controlled and kept secret. The task of developing the plan was assigned to five people, one each from the Administrative Organs Department, civilian intelligence, military intelligence, the For-
eign Department and the Military Health Administration. Sejna was in charge as Secre- tary of the Defence Council. The five people, plus a cook from Sejna's secretariat, were sequestered in a villa at Rusveltova No. 1, which incidentally was where Castro stayed when he came to visit Prague. Their work was monitored by the Soviet adviser to the chief of Zs and by Jiri Rudolf and Vaclav Havranek, who were the Administrative Organs
Department officials in charge of military intelligence and military counter-intelligence.
Only five other Czechoslovak officials had access to the villa, the Minister of Interior, the Minister of Defence, the Chief of the General Staff, the Chief of the Second Administration (civilian intelligence), and Sejna. After this group had assembled the overall plan, the only people who had access to it were the seven members of the Defence Council.
When the narcotics plan was finished, it was considered more sensitive even than even the annual intelligence plans. Nine copies were made and placed in sealed envelopes and taken to the Defence Council, where they were opened for the members to examine prior to their vote to approve the plan. The Minister of Defence and Minister of Interior jointly presented the plan to the Defence Council. The plan addressed research, development, influence of drugs on humans, testing, production, distribution, money handling, how the profits would be used, and the individuals who would have specific personal responsibilities. During the presentation, the Minister of Interior, Rudolph Barak, explained that 'Not only would this action serve to destroy Western society, but in addition the West will pay high money for it'. Antonin Novotny, First Secretary and Chairman of the Defence Council, asked how much, and Barak responded: 'Enough to finance the entire Czechoslovak intelligence service'.
As soon as the discussion was completed, not even waiting until the end of the meeting as was normally the case, Sejna collected all the copies and resealed them in their envelopes. All but three copies were destroyed. These three copies went to military intelli- gence (Zs), the Second Administration of the Minister of Interior, and the files of the Defence Council, which were in Sejna's secretariat. No written instructions to implement the plan were issued. The head of each department or agency that had a specific task came to one of the three offices where copies of the plan were held to read that portion on a 'need- to-know' basis. For example, for scientific development and production, the chiefs of the Rear Services and Medical Administration independently came to Sejna's office to read the pertinent portion of the plan. Sejna's job was to make certain each official understood his responsibility. The official was then required to sign a statement saying that he understood the directive, after which the official departed.
This process applied even to the Minister of Defence. All orders were verbal. Reports on progress were due back to Sejna in six months. Sejna himself then assembled and pre- sented these reports to the Defence Council.
A year later, in 1963, Khrushchev, displeased with the speed with which the operation was progressing, directed General Major Nikolai Savinkin, the deputy head of the Administrative Organs Department of the Central Committee of the CPSU (he would become head in 1964 following General Mironov's death in a plane crash), to visit each satellite and Cuba personally and prepare a detailed plan to accelerate and coordinate the