narcotics operation. The Administrative Organs Department is one of the two or three most important departments of the Central Committee5. It controls the Ministry of Defence, the Ministry of Interior (KGB), and the Ministry of Justice. This is the department that directed operation 'Druzhba Narodov'6. Other organisations that participated are described in the next chapter.
Savinkin's plan was approved by the Soviet Defence Council and directives were sent
to the various satellites. These directives, which came through Sejna as Secretary of the Czechoslovak Defence Council and Chief of Cabinet at the Ministry of Defence, covered a wide variety of actions: research, production, organisation of transportation, organisation of cooperation among satellites in different regions of the world, the need for cooperation in assisting Cuba to infiltrate all Latin American operations and what form that cooperation would take, names of specific people in different countries who would assist in the distribution, and associated propaganda and disinformation. Instructions were also received as to which specific financial institutions were to be used in laundering and transferring money. In the case of Czechoslovakia, at least fifteen different banks in nine countries (including Singapore, Vienna, Argentina and Holland) were identified. The Soviet bank in London became increasingly involved in the transfer of drug profits*7.
The propaganda and disinformation instructions were especially interesting. Propa- ganda, disinformation and deception are exceptionally important dimensions of all Soviet operations. Each decision that is made is thoroughly prepared, including the monitoring or oversight, secrecy provisions (that is, who is to be told what), and the 'political plan' to facilitate the implementation.
The political plan is a euphemism for the deception that is to be employed. Disinfor- mation and propaganda are developed to support the basic deception plan. In the narcotics
and drug operation, the basic thrust of propaganda and disinformation was to cause the blame to be placed on 'society'. Additionally, and in support of this basic thrust, corruption data would be released to discredit individuals and organisations considered hostile to Soviet interests8. There were two different propaganda campaigns - one waged against youth and one against the population at large. This involved the Department of Special Propaganda, the Propaganda Department and the International (Foreign) Department, with a special coordination centre set up in the Administrative Organs Department.
The basic strategy for propaganda and deception had first been set forth in 1961 or
1962 by Soviet General Kalashnik, deputy to the Chief of the Main Political Administra- tion, the ideological watchdog of the Soviet military establishment. Kalashnik was the chief ideologist at the Main Political Administration. Sejna recalls his simple instructions:
'Our propaganda must be directed to our enemy, not to our friends'. The word 'friends' meant drugs and narcotics. Propaganda and deception were to be used to divert attention away from drugs and narcotics, especially insofar as the middle and upper classes were concerned, and to cause these same people to focus their attention on problems of nuclear war, the Vietnam war and anti- Americanism.
* Editor's Note: In the late 1960s, UK employees of the Russian bank in London, Moscow Narodny Bank, observed that Russian officers of the institution were conspicuously liberal with entertainment and expense accounts, often inviting lowly members of staff to join them for extended 'liquid lunches'. For very many years, Viktor Geraschenko was either a senior officer or the head of the bank. Under Gorbachev, Geraschenko was transferred to head the central banking institution and was accordingly seen at successive Annual Meetings of the International Monetary Fund and the World Bank after Russia had acceded to the Bretton Woods institutions. He was 'restored' to the position of head of the Russian Central Bank under President Yeltsin amid the turmoil which overwhelmed the Russian financial markets in August 1998.
CHAPTER 4: Khrushchev Instructs the Satellites 41
These propaganda instructions were extended in 1964 in a letter signed by Leonid Brezhnev which was discussed at a meeting of the Czechoslovak Defence Council. The letter directed that data on the Chinese drug and narcotics trafficking operation should be made public, to advertise China's role as the source of illicit trafficking and thus to draw ttention away from the Soviet operation. (One of the first articles written for this purpose appeared in Pravda on September 13,1964. It was written by V. Ovchinnikov and was enti- tled 'The Drug Dealers': see also page 146, and Note 43, page 152).
In September 1963 the top leadership (First Secretaries, Premier Ministers, Ministers of Defence and Interior and selected staff, a total of up to 15 from each country except for Romania, Albania and Yugoslavia, which were not present) met in Moscow for the annual
conference on the plan and tactics to be followed in the coming year. The diplomatic, intel-
ligence and party initiatives - the integrated process - for the coming year, were reviewed by the Soviet leadership.
The principal speaker was Mikhail Suslov, chief ideologist of the Communist Party and one of the key officials in the development of strategic plans. In discussing drugs, Suslov began by pointing out that the decision that had been taken earlier on drug and narcotics trafficking was the right course of action. As the Soviets had assessed Latin America in the 1950s, they had recognised that the Latin American countries were depen- dent on the bourgeoisie, especially the United States. The Soviets had decided that this had to change: the Latin American countries had to be made dependent on the Soviet Union. The primary instruments to be used were drugs and other forms of corruption, which the Soviets had concluded were widespread throughout the Americas.
The Soviets referred to the revolutionary movement in Latin America as the Second
Liberation. The First Liberation had been the liberation from Spain and Portugal. The Sec- ond would be the intended liberation from the United States and the bourgeoisie9. The Third Liberation would be the transition into Communism.
Suslov explained that it was necessary to disarm anti-Communist and US friends before the Second Liberation could take place. The Soviets believed that the corrupted bourgeoisie had already accepted the idea of revolution, which was in fact a deliberate Soviet-induced deception. The approach taken to encourage acceptance of the notion of revolution was to argue that Latin American countries were destined to proceed through revolutionary stages, in which the changes that would be accomplished turn out to be beneficial. In these early stages, there was, by Soviet direction, to be no mention of socialism or even use of socialistic phrases - to avoid scaring people away from the concept of revolution.
The Soviets asserted that five factors would prove most instrumental in speeding the
revolutionary process throughout Latin America:
1. The US-USSR military balance. The Soviet Union needed to be strong enough to stop the United States from interfering before the revolution could be started.
2. Bankruptcy of colonialism. Through propagandising the exploitation and impropriety of colonial policies and, naturally, the protectionism that went along with colonialism, the United States' ties to Latin America would be weakened and ultimately severed.
3. Organisation of ideology and material supply of the liberation forces. Better organisation and a united ideological offensive were required among the liberation forces. The movement had become disjointed under Stalin. Ideological unity was necessary and the supply of
material assistance - money, arms, training, organisation - needed to be improved
throughout Latin America.
4. The defeat of the United States in Vietnam. This was important to split the United States at home and to make it difficult for the United States ever to become involved in foreign wars again. Also, it was important for nationalistic forces to recognise that the United States could not be counted upon to assist its allies against the revolutionary process.
5. The demoralisation of the United States and its neighbours on both sides, north and south. Drugs were a principal instrument to be used in bringing about this demoralisation - with demoralisation by drugs to be referred to, as noted, as the 'Pink Epidemic'10[see page 33]. The Soviets believed that when the 'Pink Epidemic' covered the North and South American continents, the situation would be highly satisfactory for the revolution.
Suslov reviewed the situation in Latin America, using data gathered by Soviet intel- ligence, local Communist parties, and from Cuban and Warsaw Pact intelligence agents who had penetrated the Latin American drug operations. Making special reference to Paraguay, Jamaica, El Salvador, Guatemala, Honduras and Mexico, Suslov asserted that seventy percent of Latin American bureaucrats were tied into (that is corrupted by) drug operations. In Mexico, he said, eighty percent of the bureaucrats were tied into drugs or involved with other forms of corruption. In Latin America, sixty-five percent of Catholic priests used drugs, he said. Catholic priests have been a primary target of Soviet strategy in Latin America".
Four years later, at a meeting in 1967, Boris Ponomarev explained to Czechoslovak officials that according to Soviet estimates, eighty percent of Latin American priests were anti-American, and slightly over sixty percent were inclined to the left12. This particular statistic was heavily weighted by young priests, whom the Soviets believed would exert important influence in Latin America over the ensuing twenty years. Boris Ponomarev advanced three reasons for working with these younger priests: to help the revolution move forward, to use the church to help distribute drugs, and to use priests to gain addi- tional information on drug-trafficking networks.
But, reverting to 1963: after reviewing intelligence statistics on the drug business, Suslov discussed two special groups against whom drugs were to be used. The first was the bourgeois leadership. Second was a group referred to as the 'lumpen proletariat' - the unemployed who often turned to crime or prostitution for survival; a somewhat equivalent term to describe this group might be the 'downtrodden proletariat'13. As Mikhail Suslov explained, this group was particularly vulnerable to the lure of drugs. That was all to the good, because it was to the advantage of the revolutionary war movement to destroy this group, as it was useless and a burden. Its members did not want to work. They were the main consumers of drugs and were to be destroyed. The key revolutionary tactic was to prepare a revolutionary elite and these downtrodden proletariat were not part of that elite.
To further the drug business, Mikhail Suslov also emphasised four points:
1. Use Cuba to help establish drug operations.
2. Be certain to obtain security clearances on all personnel first, before involving them in drug-trafficking and handling operations.
3. In the Communist Parties, brief only the First Secretaries on drug activities. The
individual Communist Parties were to be kept at arms' length from drug operations, for two main reasons. First, the Communist Parties were believed to have been infiltrated by foreign agents. Accordingly, knowledge of drug operations was to be kept away from the Parties and all personnel were to be carefully cleared prior to their involvement in drug
CHAPTER 4: Khrushchev Instructs the Satellites 43
activities. Secondly, drug operations yielded money and this in turn meant possible fiscal independence. Drug operations were therefore to be kept out of the hands of the Commu- nist Parties as a means of ensuring their continuing dependence on Moscow. Drug money used to finance foreign Communist Parties would first be channelled to Moscow and then to the various Parties according to their needs.
4. It was important to induce indigenous Latin American intelligence, counter-intel- ligence and military forces to become more involved in drug operations. These organisa-
tions represented important sources of pro-US feelings, and drug-assisted corruption was to be used to undermine such pro-American attitudes.
Khrushchev's style was to sit and interrupt the speaker to make additional points as he saw fit. He first interrupted Suslov to stress the need for caution. 'Comrade Suslov', he interjected, 'is particularly careful. I tried to force him to speed up the drug process - to make the bourgeoisie pay for the revolution - but I agree with him. We cannot take higher risk than we are taking now'. At another point Khrushchev interrupted and explained:
'Some people equate drugs and alcohol, but alcohol is not like drugs. We give vodka to
Soviet soldiers and we proceed from success to success'.
Suslov also pointed out that it was necessary to begin creating reserves for the Latin American revolutionary forces, so that their needs would be satisfied when they were ready to step out from the underground. Accordingly, all Warsaw Pact countries were to begin contributing to a Latin America reserves account.
Suslov's speech left nothing to the imagination. Operation 'Druzhba Narodov' was to be global in scope. The bourgeoisie in all countries were targets. Drugs and narcotics were to be primary weapons for use in the world revolutionary offensive.
As the Soviet 'Druzhba Narodov' strategy took shape in 1962-64, probably the best, most succinct description of the targeting philosophy was provided to the Czechoslovak leadership in 1964 during a visit to Bulgaria. Todor Zhivkov, First Secretary of the Com- munist Party of Bulgaria, explained to the visiting Czechoslovak delegation that the United States was the primary target of the Soviet Bloc's drug offensive because it was the worst enemy ('the Main Enemy'), because it was simple to move drugs into the United States,
and because there was an unlimited supply of hard money there.
References to Chapter 4:
1. US Drug Enforcement Agency, The Involvement of the People's Republic of Bulgaria in Interna- tional Narcotics Trafficking', in US Congress, Senate, Drugs and Terrorism, 1984, Hearing Before the Sub- committee on Alcoholism and Drug Abuse of the Committee on Labour and Human Resources, August 2,
1984 (US Government Printing Office: Washington, D.C., 1984).
2. Ibid., page 66.
3. Ibid., page 58.
4. Ibid., page 61.
5. The importance of this department is also emphasised in John J. Dziak, Chekisty: A History of the
KGB (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books, 1988), pages 148,151-152.
6. The head of the Administrative Organs Department, incidentally, was also the Soviet official in charge of the Soviet arms control operation during the 1960s.
7. Dr Zdzislaw M. Rurarz was a member of Polish military intelligence (Zll) for 25 years, economic adviser to the Ministries of Foreign Trade and Foreign Affairs and to the First Secretary, and Ambassador to Japan before defecting to the United States in 1981. He explained to the author that before he left, he believed the number of Soviet banks, financial institutions, and joint ventures around the world that were
available to assist in the money handling process was about 300. Subsequently, he learned from a French source that the number had risen to 400.
8. While there is no known connection, one example of an event which could have been triggered by the Soviets was the drug scandal involving the old Bureau of Narcotics in which US Federal agents
were found to be selling heroin or protecting drug dealers. This scandal was disclosed by Attorney General Ramsey Clark in 1968. It resulted in almost every agent in the New York bureau being fired, forced to resign, or transferred. Edward Jay Epstein, Agency of Fear: Opiates and Political Power in America (New York: G. P. Putnam's Sons, 1977), page 105. See also US Congress, Senate, International Traffic in Narcotics, Hearing Before the Committee on Foreign Relations, July 1,1971 (Washington, D.C.: US Government Printing Office, 1971), page 29.
9. Sejna first heard this view on the liberation phases in about 1962 from Andrei Kirilenko, Khrushchev's deputy, at a meeting of the Warsaw Pact leadership. Kirilenko explained that the Soviet strategy was to keep the United States out of the world revolutionary process by building a fire under the
10. 'Pink Epidemic' was the codename for the operation to 'serve and extend' the cocaine epidemic
which the Soviets believed would be the wave of the future. See Chapter 3.
11. Miguel Bolanos Hunter was a former counter-intelligence officer in the counterespionage section
of the Nicaraguan state security apparatus. In an interview for the Oral History Project, International
Security Studies Program, Fletcher School of Law and Diplomacy, Bolanos reviewed the origins, structure,
and missions of the state security apparatus. With respect to the church, he said: To the Sandinistas, the [traditional Catholic] Church is Enemy Number One. There is no doubt about it'. [Testimony of Miguel Bolanos Hunter, in Uri Ra'anan et al., Hydra of Carnage (Lexington, Massachusetts: Lexington Books,
1986), page 309].
As Jan Sejna explained religions are viewed as an especially dangerous force within socialist coun-
tries and in all countries being prepared for revolution, given the conflict between Marxist and religious
morality. [The attack on religion is at the core of the revolution: Gorbachev proclaimed on 15th December
1987, after all, that 'there must be no let-up in the war against religion because as long as religion exists,
Communism cannot prevail. We must intensify the obliteration of all religions wherever they are being
practiced or taught' - Ed.]. Within socialist countries, the long-term - 50-year - objective was to eliminate
the importance and influence of religions. Outside the socialist countries, propaganda, deception, diplo-
macy and intelligence services were to be used to destroy, influence or use the various religions. Within the
Third World countries, religions were viewed as 'temporary friends' because they supported the revo- lutionary spirit.
Overall, the principal directions of Soviet activity directed against religions were as follows:
• To encourage leading religious centres to support the Soviet policy of peaceful coexistence.
• To compel leading religious groups to deny their support for capitalism and to promote the idea
that the rich countries must help the poor countries.
• To support desired political, social and economic changes which will bring the Communists to power in the various targeted countries.
• Through propaganda and deception, to show that socialism is allied with religious groups in the
'fight' for a better life generally.
• To use religious groups to exploit and further disarmament - that is, to exploit the idea that it is
against the will of God to kill people. [For the revolutionaries are content invoke God, of course,
when it suits their purposes to do so - Ed.].
• To build a mass psychological perception of nuclear warfare as signifying the end of the world.
• To infiltrate the religious centres with the following order of priority:
(1). The Vatican;
(2). Moslems; (3). Jews;
(5). Reactionary sects. With reference to 'reactionary sects', Czechoslovak intelligence had three
clerical agents within the Vatican in the late 1960s. They were located, Sejna asserted, within the sections
responsible for foreign policy, finance and ideology. The Moslems were particularly important because of
their role within the Middle East and Africa. One consequence of the Arab-Israeli War was that it enabled
Soviet Bloc intelligence services to infiltrate all of the leading Moslem centres.
The Jewish community was regarded as an especially important target to assist the Soviet Union to
gain economic influence over the West, and as an especially important source for intelligence information, and as a liberal counterweight against right-wing forces. The most difficult religion for the Soviets to manipulate was Buddhism because divergent physical characteristics made the religious order difficult to infiltrate. Reactionary (conservative) sects, which were also anti-Communist, were regarded as having considerable political influence. These sects also desired to achieve control and power, which the Com- munist plan exploited. In 1967, the Communists had obtained inside information on, or influence over, by
their estimate, in excess of 40 percent of the various sects and other religions.
According to the Communist Manual of Instruction of Psychological Warfare. 'As it seems in foreign
nations that the church is the most ennobling influence, each and every branch and activity of each and
every church must, one way or another, be discredited. Religion must become unfashionable by