Events Leading Up to the 2003 Invasion of Iraq
Project: Inquiry into the Decision to Invade Iraq
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In a letter to his law partner, William H. Herndon, Abraham Lincoln disagrees with Herndon’s argument for preemptive war. “Allow the president to invade a neighboring nation, whenever he shall deem it necessary to repel an invasion… and you allow him to make war at pleasure.… The provision of the Constitution giving the war making power to Congress was dictated, as I understand it, by the following reasons: kings had always been involving and impoverishing their people in wars, pretending generally, if not always, that the good of the people was the object. This our convention understood to be the most oppressive of all kingly oppressions, and they resolved to so frame the Constitution that no one man should hold the power of bringing this oppression upon us. But your view destroys the whole matter, and places our President where kings have always stood.” [LINCOLN, 2/15/1848]
British forces invade Iraq and occupy Baghdad, ostensibly to save the Iraqis from the Ottoman Empire during World War I. In reality, the occupation is at least partly motivated by the desire to secure the Iraqi oil fields for Britain. Lieutenant General Sir Stanley Maude proclaims: “Our armies do not come into your cities and lands as conquerors or enemies, but as liberators. You people of Baghdad are not to understand that it is the wish of the British government to impose upon you alien institutions. It is the hope of the British government that once again the people of Baghdad shall flourish, enjoying their wealth and substance under institutions which are in consonance with their sacred laws.” Author and former CIA agent Larry Kolb will write in 2007: “That sounded a lot to me like the rosy assurances our own [American] leaders gave the Iraqis in 2003 not long after we flattened half of Baghdad and then drove our tanks into what was left of it. But history shows that eventually the British liberators were driven out of Iraq by pissed-off locals, the insurgency. Just as eventually British liberators were driven out of Palestine, by both Jews and Arabs. And just as Napoleon, the liberator of Egypt, had eventually been forced by the locals to abandon the Nile in humiliation. The track record of Western armies fighting local insurgencies is abysmal. If President Bush didn’t know that, surely someone on his staff should have.” [KOLB, 2007, PP. 93-94] Three years later, the British will find themselves battling a fierce insurgency in central Iraq (see Early 1920).
In a letter to British Foreign Secretary Arthur Balfour, Sir Maurice Hankey, Britain’s First Secretary of the War Cabinet, writes, “Oil in the next war will occupy the place of coal in the present war, or at least a parallel place to coal. The only big potential supply that we can get under British control is the Persian [now Iran] and Mesopotamian [now Iraq] supply… Control over these oil supplies becomes a first class British war aim.” [YERGIN, 1993; MUTTITT, 2005]
Entity Tags: Maurice Hankey, Arthur Balfour
Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran
Category Tags: Motives
Three years after Britain declared victory in Iraq (see 1917), their occupational forces are locked in fierce fighting with an Iraqi insurgency that had grown up in the Iraqi city of Fallujah. The British begin a campaign of aerial bombing against Fallujah and Baghdad, and heavy urban assaults in Samarra. [KOLB, 2007, PP. 94]
British generals announce that the insurgency in Iraq (see Early 1920) has been defeated. But former British Army intelligence officer T. E. Lawrence—“Lawrence of Arabia”—disagrees, in a dispatch published by the London Times. “The people of England have been led in Mesopotamia into a trap from which it will be hard to escape with dignity and honor,” Lawrence writes. “Things have been far worse than we have told. We are today not far from a disaster.” Lawrence knows the insurgents—indeed, he had helped train them in the techniques of guerrilla warfare. [KOLB, 2007, PP. 94]
Ahmed Chalabi.[Source: Tim Sloan / Agence France-Presse]On October 30, 1944, Ahmed Chalabi is born into a wealthy, oligarchic Shiite family with close ties to Iraq’s Hashemite monarchy. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; COUNTERPUNCH, 5/20/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] Chalabi’s mother runs political salons catering to Iraq’s elite and his father loans money to members of the ruling family who reward him with top posts in the government, which he uses to advance his business interests. His grandfather was also close to the monarchy, holding nine cabinet positions in government during his lifetime. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] But it was Chalabi’s great grandfather who, as the tax farmer of Kadimiah, a town near Baghdad, established the family’s grand fortunes. According to Iraqi historian Hanna Batatu, Ahmed’s great grandfather was “a very harsh man, [who] kept a bodyguard of armed slaves and had a special prison at his disposal” where, according to a friend of Chalabi’s, he imprisoned serfs who failed to pay their taxes or produce wheat. “When he died the people of Kadimiah heaved a sigh of relief,” Batatu writes.[BATATU, 2004; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004] In 1958, Chalabi’s family will flee Iraq when the Iraqi Communist Party overthrows the monarchy. Decades later, Imad Khadduri, a schoolmate of Chalabi’s, will say: “Ahmed wanted to avenge his father’s ouster and the deprivation of his lands.… Now he’s trying to fit in his father’s shoes.”[UNGER, 2007, PP. 123]
The chief of the State Department’s Division of Near Eastern Affairs, writes in a memo that the oil resources of Saudi Arabia are a “stupendous source of strategic power and one of the greatest material prizes in world history.” [CURTIS, 1995, PP. 21;MUTTITT, 2005]
An introductory paper on the Middle East put out by the British government states that the Middle East is “a vital prize for any power interested in world influence or domination.” [CURTIS, 1995, PP. 21; MUTTITT, 2005]
The first “Zippe-type” gas centrifuge, named after one of its main developers, German scientist Gernot Zippe, is produced. The centrifuge uses duralumin rotors. Centrifuge rotors are thin-walled tubes that spin at high speeds producing enriched uranium 235. Centrifuge rotors are highly sensitive and must be made from specialized high-strength material. [ALBRIGHT, 10/9/2003]
The use of aluminum for rotors in gas centrifuges is discontinued. Other materials, such as maraging steel and carbon fiber, are used instead. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/10/2003]
Category Tags: Aluminum Tubes Allegation
During a news conference, President Dwight D. Eisenhower answers a question about the idea of an American “preventative war” against Communism by saying the following: “All of us have heard this term ‘preventive war’ since the earliest days of Hitler. I recall that is about the first time I heard it. In this day and time, if we believe for one second that nuclear fission and fusion, that type of weapon, would be used in such a war—what is a preventive war? I would say a preventive war, if the words mean anything, is to wage some sort of quick police action in order that you might avoid a terrific cataclysm of destruction later. A preventive war, to my mind, is an impossibility today. How could you have one if one of its features would be several cities lying in ruins, several cities where many, many thousands of people would be dead and injured and mangled, the transportation systems destroyed, sanitation implements and systems all gone? That isn’t preventive war; that is war. I don’t believe there is such a thing; and, frankly, I wouldn’t even listen to anyone seriously that came in and talked about such a thing.” [WHITE HOUSE, 8/11/1954]
Entity Tags: Dwight Eisenhower
Timeline Tags: US International Relations
Category Tags: Legal Justification
After the 1958 coup that deposes King Faisal II of Iraq, Ahmed Chalabi, 13, and his family flee to Lebanon because of their close ties to the Iraqi Hashemite monarchy (see October 30, 1944). The young Ahmed then goes to England where he attends boarding school. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; COUNTERPUNCH, 5/20/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004]
Ahmed Chalabi, an Iraqi exile, studies for his doctorate in math at the University of Chicago where he gets to know Albert Wohlstetter, a prominent cold-war strategist and a mentor for Paul Wolfowitz and Richard Perle. After receiving his degree, Chalabi moves to Lebanon where he works as a math teacher at the American University of Beirut. His brother, Jawad, is also living in Beirut and runs Middle East Banking Corp. (Mebco). [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; SALON, 5/5/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 6/15/2004]
Entity Tags: Ahmed Chalabi, Jawad Chalabi, Albert Wohlstetter
Timeline Tags: Neoconservative Influence
Category Tags: Chalabi and the INC
The Chalabi family, with some local partners, found the Middle East Banking Corp. (Mebco). [SALON, 5/5/2004]
Secretary of State Henry Kissinger signs a “Memorandum of Understanding” with Israel obligating the US to ensure the security of Israel’s oil reserves and energy supply in times of crisis. “The memorandum… [is] quietly renewed every five years” according to the London Observer, “with special legislation attached whereby the US stocks a strategic oil reserve for Israel even if it entail[s] domestic shortages—at a cost of $3 billion in 2002 to US taxpayers.” [STATE OF ISRAEL :: MINISTRY OF FOREIGN AFFAIRS, 9/1/1975; JANES FOREIGN REPORT, 4/16/2003; OBSERVER, 4/20/2003] In the event that commercial shippers refuse to ship oil to Israel, the US is obligated to ship it using its own tankers. [JANES FOREIGN REPORT, 4/16/2003]
Ahmed Chalabi moves to Jordan where he founds Petra Bank. His partners include wealthy families from Kuwait and Saudi Arabia. [GUARDIAN, 4/14/2003; SALON, 5/4/2004;CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 6/15/2004]
Iraq imports 4,514 kilograms of natural uranium from Italy. The uranium is used in the Experimental Research Laboratory for Fuel Fabrication (ERLFF) for research and development related to the construction of a nuclear reactor. The International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA) later finds that 191 kilograms of uranium is unaccounted for. In 1997, it will note, “This amount is less than the declared accumulation of ‘material unaccounted for’ and measured discards over the period 1982 to 1990 and may be considered to be consistent with the nature of the facility operation.” The remainder is verified and controlled by the IAEA, at the “Location C” storage facility near the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq. [INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 1997]
Entity Tags: International Atomic Energy Agency
Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Africa-Uranium Allegation
Two years after its founding, Petra Bank, run by Ahmed Chalabi, is the second largest bank in Jordan. The bank’s success is attributed to the Chalabi family’s vast network of international connections which has enabled Petra to move money in and out of Jordan several steps ahead of the Jordon’s strict exchange controls. “They were far more efficient than the other banks,” a Jordanian businessman tells Salon. Chalabi’s bank lends money to several influential figures, including Prince Hasan, now a close acquaintance of Chalabi, to whom the bank lends $30 million. Chalabi’s friendship with Hassan enables Petra to open a chain of branches in the Israeli-occupied West Bank. [GUARDIAN, 4/14/2003; SALON, 5/4/2004;NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 6/15/2004] During this period, Petra bank even does business with Saddam Hussein, helping the dictator finance Iraqi trade with Jordan. [SALON, 5/5/2004]
Iraq procures “yellowcake” uranium from Portugal, Niger, and Brazil. Since neither Niger nor Brazil are members of the Non-Proliferation Treaty, they are not required to submit the transaction to the International Atomic Energy Agency (IAEA). Portugal, a signatory to the treaty, informs the IAEA of the transfers. Iraq also notifies the IAEA of the transfer in August 1981 and again in July 1982. The total amount of yellowcake uranium secured by Iraq is 563,290 kilograms. The IAEA verifies the amount transferred to Iraq; including the loss of about 40 kilograms from a drum damaged during Iraq’s salvaging and concealment attempts in 1991. Like other uranium transferred to Iraq (see 1979 and 1982), this uranium is verified and accounted for by International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspectors, and is kept at “Location C,” a storage complex near the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq. Later inspections show that Iraq has not been fully honest about its uranium purchases; it is not until July 1991 that Iraq declares the full amount of uranium it has received. Furthermore, later inspections will show that “considerable” amounts of uranium cannot be accounted for. By July 1994, IAEA inspectors will verify the complete amounts and dispositions of Iraq’s yellowcake. [INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 1997]
Entity Tags: International Atomic Energy Agency
Timeline Tags: Niger Uranium and Plame Outing
Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Africa-Uranium Allegation
At this time, an engineer by the name of Joe Turner is working in the gas centrifuge program at Oak Ridge National Laboratory. His work pertains not to actual centrifuges, but to the platforms upon which the centrifuges are installed.[WASHINGTON POST, 8/10/2003; WORLDNETDAILY, 8/12/2003 SOURCES: UNNAMED US INTELLIGENCE, US ADMINISTRATION, AND/OR UN INSPECTORS]
Joe T., an engineer, begins working for the CIA. [WASHINGTON POST, 8/10/2003 SOURCES:UNNAMED US INTELLIGENCE, US ADMINISTRATION, AND/OR UN INSPECTORS]
Shatt al-Arab waterway. [Source: CNN]Iraq invades Iran, officially beginning a nine-year war between those two countries, though Iraq insists that Iran has been launching artillery attacks against Iraqi targets since September 4. The overarching reason, according to Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein, is over control of the Shatt al-Arab, the geographically critical waterway between Iran and Iraq that empties into the Persian Gulf. (Iraq signed over partial control of the Shatt al-Arab to Iran in 1975, but reclaimed the waterway in 1979 after the fall of Iran’s Shah Reza Pahlavi; Iraq also has hopes to conquer the oil-rich Iranian province of Khuzestan.) The United States will provide covert military support to both Iran (see November 3, 1986) and Iraq (see1981-1988) during the war. [INFOPLEASE, 2007]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein
Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran, US-Iraq 1980s, Iran-Contra Affair
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
Iraq begins developing “Zippe-type” centrifuges (see 1950s). The centrifuges use rotors made from maraging steel and carbon fiber, which are more advanced than aluminum and allow the rotor to spin at significantly higher speeds. But Iraq has problems building centrifuges—even with considerable assistance from German experts. [ALBRIGHT, 10/9/2003]
The Reagan administration provides covert support to Iraq in an effort to prevent Iran from overrunning the oil-rich states of the Persian Gulf. [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002; NATION, 8/26/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
US Air Force officers are secretly deployed to Iraq to assist their counterparts in the Iraqi military. [NATION, 8/26/2002] The US provides satellite photography to Iraq revealing the movements of the Iranian forces. [WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002 SOURCES: SENIOR MILITARY OFFICERS WITH DIRECT KNOWLEDGE OF THE PROGRAM, UNNAMED INFORMED SOURCES INTERVIEWED BY REPORTER BOB WOODWARD] The US provides Iraq with intelligence gathered by Saudi-owned AWACS operated by the Pentagon. [NATION, 8/26/2002] Iraq uses US-supplied military intelligence “to calibrate attacks with mustard gas on Iranian ground troops….” (see 1984) [WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986] “[M]ore than 60 officers of the Defense Intelligence Agency…. secretly [provide] detailed information on Iranian deployments, tactical planning for battles, plans for airstrikes and bomb-damage assessments for Iraq.” [NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002] President Reagan and Vice President George Bush personally deliver military advice to Saddam Hussein, both directly and through intermediaries (see 1986).[AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO IRAQ], 1/31/1995 
; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002] The US closely monitors “third country arms sales to Iraq to make sure Iraq [has] the military weaponry required.” [AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002] According to the censured portion of Iraq’s December 7, 2002 declaration to the UN (see December 7, 2002) (see December 19, 2002), Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory and Sandia National Laboratories help train Iraqi nuclear weapons scientists and provide nonfissile material for Iraq’s nuclear weapons program. [SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1/26/2003]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, United Nations, Lawrence Livermore National Laboratory, Sandia National Laboratories, George Herbert Walker Bush, Defense Intelligence Agency, Ronald Reagan, US Department of the Air Force, US Department of Defense, Reagan administration
Timeline Tags: US confrontation with Iran, US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
US and British companies are among several Western firms that sell Iraq materials that can be used to develop nuclear, chemical, biological, and conventional weapons. [ASSOCIATED PRESS, 12/21/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/21/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1/26/2003; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003]
United States - Biological: American Type Culture Collection, several biological precursor agents for diseases like anthrax, gangrene, and the West Nile virus; Alcolac International, Thiodiglycol, the mustard gas precursor; Al Haddad, 60 tons of a chemical that could be used to make sarin; Dow Chemical, $1.5 million of pesticides (seeDecember 1988). [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/21/2002;WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002] Nuclear: TI Coating; UNISYS; Tektronix; Leybold Vacuum Systems; Finnigan-MAT-US; Hewlett Packard; Dupont; Consarc; Cerberus (LTD) ; Canberra Industries; Axel Electronics Inc. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002] Rocket Program: Honeywell ;TI Coating; UNISYS; Honeywell; Semetex; Sperry Corp.; Tektronix; Hewlett Packard; Eastman Kodak; Electronic Associates; EZ Logic Data Systems, Inc. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002] Conventional weapons: Honeywell; Spektra Physics; TI Coating; UNISYS; Sperry Corp.; Rockwell; Hewlett Packard; Carl Zeis -U.S; Union Carbide. [DIE TAGESZEITUNG (BERLIN), 10/18/2002; Z MAGAZINE, 10/29/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; SAN FRANCISCO CHRONICLE, 1/26/2003]
United Kingdom - : Nuclear weapons: Euromac Ltd-UK.; C Plath-Nuclear; Endshire Export Marketing; International Computer Systems; MEED International; International Computer Limited; Matrix Churchill Corp.; Ali Ashour Daghir.; Inwako; XYY Options, Inc. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003] Chemical weapons: MEED International; International Computer Systems; International Military Services; Sheffield Forgemasters; Technology Development Group; International Signal and Control; Terex Corporation; Walter Somers Ltd.[SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003] Conventional: International Computer Systems; International Computer Limited; TMG Engineering. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 2/23/2003]
Entity Tags: Rockwell, Matrix Churchill Corp., MEED International, Technology Development Group, Inwako, Leybold Vacuum Systems, Semetex, International Signal and Control, Sheffield Forgemasters, Tektronix, Sperry Corp., XYY Options, Inc.,Walter Somers Ltd., Union Carbide, UNISYS, Terex Corporation, Spektra Physics, TMG Engineering, International Military Services, International Computer Systems, TI Coating, Honeywell, Carl Zeis -U.S, Canberra Industries, C Plath-Nuclear, Axel Electronics Inc., American Type Culture Collection, Al Haddad, Alcolac International,Ali Ashour Daghir, Cerberus (LTD), International Computer Limited, Dow Chemical,Euromac Ltd-UK, Finnigan-MAT-US, Hewlett Packard, Consarc, Endshire Export Marketing, Eastman Kodak, Electronic Associates, Dupont, EZ Logic Data Systems, Inc.
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
Israeli prime minister Menachem Begin calls televangelist and nascent political ally Jerry Falwell (see 1980) and says: “Tomorrow you’re going to read some strange things about what we’re going to do. But our safety is at stake. I wanted you, my good friend, to know what we are going to do.” Israel is preparing to use US-provided F-16s to destroy Iraq’s Osirak nuclear reactor (see June 7, 1981). Begin is concerned that the US will object to Israel’s use of the aircraft for non-defensive purposes. Falwell tells Begin, “I want to congratulate you for a mission that [makes] us very proud that we manufactured those F-16s.” Many Reagan officials are not happy that Israel violated the agreement with the US over use of the warplanes, but even though Vice President Bush and Chief of Staff James Baker both believe that Israel should be punished, Begin has provided himself cover on the Christian right. [UNGER, 2007, PP. 109-110]
Entity Tags: Reagan administration, George Herbert Walker Bush, James A. Baker,Jerry Falwell, Menachem Begin
Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Weapons of Mass Destruction
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Osirak nuclear facility. [Source: GlobalSecurity.org] (click image to enlarge)On the order of Prime Minister Menachem Begin and after heated debate among Israeli leaders, Israeli warplanes strike the Osirak (also spelled Osiraq) Tammuz I nuclear plant at al-Tuwaitha near Baghdad, destroying it and dealing a severe setback to Iraq’s nuclear program. Israel claims it fears Iraq is building a nuclear weapon with which to strike it. Osirak is a French-made nuclear reactor, which is near completion but lacks any nuclear fuel, thereby raising no danger of any radioactive link. Ariel Sharon, concurrently Defense Minister and a proponent of the strike, later says, “This was perhaps the most difficult decision which faced any [Israeli] government during all the years of the state’s existence.” The Israeli government states after the strike, “The atomic bombs which that reactor was capable of producing, whether from enriched uranium or from plutonium, would be of the Hiroshima size. Thus a mortal danger to the people of Israel progressively arose.… Under no circumstances will we allow an enemy to develop weapons of mass destruction against our people.” The reactor is slated to be completed by September, 1981, though it would be years before it could produce any nuclear-grade fissionable material. Iraq denies the reactor is developed to produce nuclear weapons, though the construction of the plant gives credence to claims that Iraq is more interested in building a weapon than generating electricity. (After the strike, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein says, “Any state in the world which really wants peace… should help the Arabs in one way or another to acquire atomic bombs,” giving further credence to suspicions that Hussein wanted to build a nuclear weapon.) The Israeli strike follows up a September 1980 raid on the Osirak facility by Iranian warplanes (see September 30, 1980). Publicly, Iran and Israel are dire enemies, but Israel has begun secretly selling US-made arms to Iran as a way to counterbalance the threat posed by Iraq (see 1981). [BBC, 7/7/1981; NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; INSTITUTE FOR STRATEGIC STUDIES, 5/1995] In 1984, Brookings Institute fellow Lucien Vandenbroucke will write, “Ironically, Israel’s raid may prove to be a brilliant tactical success achieved at the expense of the country’s long-term interests. Certainly, the attack set Iraq’s nuclear program back several years. But the strike also ushered in a de facto Israeli claim to nuclear monopoly in the Middle East, a move that in the long run generally promises to encourage the larger Arab world on the nuclear path.… In the decision-making process, Israeli fears and the propensity to rely on worst-case analyses seem to have prevailed. The advocates of the strike focused on the unreasonable, rather than the reasonable, aspects of Iraqi behavior, and thus even a limited prospect that Iraq might soon acquire a nuclear bomb became more of a risk than they were prepared to accept.” [GLOBALSECURITY (.ORG), 10/1984]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Menachem Begin, Brookings Institute, Lucien Vandenbroucke
Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Africa-Uranium Allegation
Iraq imports 1,767 kilograms of enriched uranium from Italy, and 6,005 kilograms of depleted uranium from Italy as well. As with its earlier uranium import from Italy (see 1979), this uranium is verified and accounted for by International Atomic Energy Association (IAEA) inspectors, and is kept at “Location C,” a storage complex near the Tuwaitha nuclear research facility in central Iraq. [INTERNATIONAL ATOMIC ENERGY AGENCY, 1997]
Entity Tags: International Atomic Energy Agency
Category Tags: Alleged WMDs, Africa-Uranium Allegation
Ronald Reagan (left) and William Casey (right).[Source: CIA]President Reagan orders the Defense Department and the CIA to supply Iraq’s military with intelligence information, advice, and hardware for battle after being advised to do so by CIA Director William Casey. Former Reagan national security official Howard Teicher will later reveal that Casey “personally spearheaded the effort to insure that Iraq had sufficient military weapons, ammunition and vehicles to avoid losing the Iran-Iraq war.” The US will continue to provide this type of intelligence to Iraq until 1988. [AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; KNIGHT RIDDER, 2/24/1995; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; NEW YORK TIMES, 8/18/2002]
Entity Tags: William Casey, Howard Teicher, Ronald Reagan
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
Caspar Weinberger.[Source: US Department of Defense]Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, a vehement opponent of the US’s arms sales to Iran (see 1981 and December 20, 1983), concludes that if Iraq doesn’t receive military aid, it will lose its war with Iran (see September 1980). Weinberger arranges the secret swap of a Soviet T-72 tank given to the Iraqi military in return for four US howitzers. Some Pentagon intelligence officials covet the Soviet tank for the information they can glean about Soviet weaponry, but, according to two highly placed officials in the Reagan administration, Weinberger sees the deal as an opportunity to begin direct US arms shipments to Iraq. A Pentagon official explains in 1992, “Cap’s view was that once the first arms shipments to Iraq were authorized by the President, the first bite of the forbidden apple had been taken, and other direct covert arms sales to Iraq would follow.” However, the exchange falls through when the Iraqis, fearful that the Soviet Union will terminate its own military aid program, withdraws from the deal. A subsequent Iraqi offer to exchange a Soviet HIND helicopter also falls through when the Pentagon expresses its concerns over the criminal record of the middleman, a Lebanese-born international arms trafficker. However, Reagan and Defense Department officials continue to find ways to secretly supply arms to Iraq (see October 1983). Later, Weinberger will call the Iranian arms deals “insanity. How could you send arms to the Ayatollah when he was sworn to destroy us?” But Weinberger will be much less forthcoming about the US’s arms sales to Iraq, summed up under the sobriquet of “Iraqgate.” Weinberger will later claim that he is not involved in any arms deals with Iraq, and will say, “The little that I know was that it was all handled by the CIA. There might have been a role by some people in the Pentagon. But I didn’t keep a hand in that.” He will refuse to acknowledge the accuracy of Pentagon memos from 1982 and 1983 sent directly to him that outline proposals to arm Iraq. In a 1992 news article, reporters Murray Waas and Craig Unger note that Weinberger will repeatedly lie “without compunction” about his involvement in arms sales to Iraq over the coming years, and observe, “Whenever his credibility is questioned, Weinberger routinely invokes concerns for national security and hides behind a veil of secrecy.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, Central Intelligence Agency, Caspar Weinberger, Reagan administration, Murray Waas, Craig Unger
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
The Reagan administration—despite stern objections from Congress—removes Iraq from the US State Department’s list of states sponsoring terrorism (see 1979).[NEW YORK TIMES, 2/28/1982; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002] This clears the way for future US military aid to that country. [PHYTHIAN, 1997]
President Reagan issues a national security directive which formalizes US policy toward the Iraq-Iran war, committing the US to continued support for Iraq to avoid an Iranian victory. The document is authored by National Security aides Howard Teicher and Geoff Kemp. [AFFIDAVIT. UNITED STATES V. CARLOS CARDOEN, ET AL. [CHARGE THAT TELEDYNE WAH CHANG ALBANY ILLEGALLY PROVIDED A PROSCRIBED SUBSTANCE, ZIRCONIUM, TO CARDOEN INDUSTRIES AND TO IRAQ], 1/31/1995 ; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002]
Entity Tags: Ronald Reagan, Geoff Kemp, Howard Teicher
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
Secretary of Commerce Howard Baldridge and Secretary of State George Shultz successfully lobby the National Security Council (NSC) adviser to approve the sale of 10 Bell helicopters to Iraq in spite of objections from other NSC members. It is claimed that the helicopters will be used for crop spraying. These same helicopters are later used in 1988 to deploy poison gas against Iranians and possibly Iraqi Kurds (see March 1988). [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991; PHYTHIAN, 1997, PP. 37-38]
Entity Tags: Howard Baldridge, George Shultz, National Security Council
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt supply Iraq with US howitzers, helicopters, bombs, and other weapons with the secret approval of the Reagan administration. [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; PHYTHIAN, 1997, PP. 35] Italy also funnels arms to Iraq at the insistence of President Reagan who personally made the request to Prime Minister Guilio Andreotti. [FRIEDMAN, 1993, PP. 51-54; PHYTHIAN, 1997, PP. 36]
Entity Tags: Guilio Andreotti, Ronald Reagan
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
William Eagleton, the chief of the US-interests section in Baghdad, writes a memo that asserts the US can secretly supply arms to Iraq for use against Iran through third-party nations. “We can selectively lift restrictions on third party transfers of US-licensed military equipment to Iraq,” he writes. Although Eagleton is not the architect of this policy—that is primarily Defense Secretary Caspar Weinberger, Secretary of State George Shultz, and Shultz’s assistant, Richard Murphy, who fear that Iran will lead a rise of Islamic fundamentalism throughout the region—Eagleton’s memo heralds the onset of US arms transfers to Iraq through several regional countries, including Jordan, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait, and Egypt. The arms transfers are almost certainly illegal, a direct violation of the Arms Export Control Act, which directs the president to inform Congress if any such third-party arms transfers are enacted. Reagan officials decide not to inform Congress because they know Congress will never approve the arms transfers, particularly in light of the US’s stated policy of neutrality towards the Iran-Iraq War. Congress also knows nothing of the Reagan administration’s secret supplying of arms to Iran (see 1981). [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: William Eagleton, George Shultz, Richard W. Murphy, Caspar Weinberger
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
US State Department official Jonathan T. Howe sends Secretary of Defense Lawrence Eagleburger a memo reporting that US intelligence has determined that “Iraq has acquired a CW [chemical weapons] production capability, primarily from Western firms, including possibly a US foreign subsidiary” and that Iraq has used chemical weapons against Iranian forces and Kurdish insurgents. Referring to the US policy “of seeking a halt to CW use wherever it occurs,” Howe says the US is “considering” approaching Iraq directly, but in a way that avoids playing “into Iran’s hands by fueling its propaganda against Iraq.” Significantly, the memo acknowledges that the US has so far limited its “efforts against the Iraqi CW program to close monitoring because of our strict neutrality in the Gulf war, the sensitivity of sources, and the low probability of achieving desired results.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 11/1/1983 ]
Entity Tags: Jonathan T. Howe, Lawrence Eagleburger
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
US President Ronald Reagan issues National Security Directive 114 on the United States’ policy toward the Iran-Iraq war. The document—which makes no mention of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons—calls for increased regional military cooperation to protect oil facilities and for improving US military capabilities in the region. The directive states, “Because of the real and psychological impact of a curtailment in the flow of oil from the Persian Gulf on the international economic system, we must assure our readiness to deal promptly with actions aimed at disrupting that traffic.” [US PRESIDENT, 11/26/1983 ]
Rumsfeld greets Hussein. [Source: Washington Note.com]US Special Envoy Donald Rumsfeld—formerly the Secretary of Defense and now the CEO of the pharmaceutical company, GD Searle and Co.—personally meets with Saddam Hussein for 90 minutes in an attempt to reestablish diplomatic relations with Iraq. Rumsfeld also discusses US interest in the construction of the Iraq-Jordan Aqaba oil pipeline [to be built by Bechtel (see December 2, 1983)]. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/10/1983 ; IRAQI TELEVISION, 12/20/1983; US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ; MSNBC, 8/18/2002; NEWSWEEK, 9/23/2002; WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002;VALLETTE, 3/24/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 4/14/2003] Rumsfeld does not raise the issue of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons with Saddam. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ]Rumsfeld also delivers a letter to Hussein from Reagan administration officials declaring that for Iraq to be defeated by Iran (see September 1980) would be “contrary to United States interests.” Rumsfeld’s visit represents one side of the somewhat double-edged US foreign policy in the region: the US has allowed Israel to sell US-made arms to Iran for use against Iraq (see 1981). By this time, the US has already started clandestinely providing arms to Iraq as well (see October 1983).[NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992] After his meeting with the Iraqi president, Rumsfeld meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz. They agree that “the US and Iraq… [share] many common interests.” Rumsfeld briefly mentions US concerns about Iraq’s chemical weapons, explaining that US “efforts to assist [Iraq]… [are] inhibited by certain things that made it difficult for us….” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 12/21/1983 ]On September 19, 2002, almost two decades later, Rumsfeld will be questioned in Congress about this visit (see September 19, 2002). [US CONGRESS, 9/20/2002]
Entity Tags: Donald Rumsfeld, Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein, Reagan administration
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s, Iran-Contra Affair
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
The CIA secretly provides Iraqi intelligence with instructions on how to “calibrate” its mustard gas attacks on Iranian troops. [WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Vice-President George H.W. Bush becomes involved in the Reagan administration’s covert arming of Iraq, an operation which eventually comes to be known as “Iraqgate.” There is no evidence to show that Bush knew about the Pentagon’s efforts to arm Iraq through third parties (see October 1983), but subsequent aspects of the operation go through the National Security Planning Group, of which Bush is a member. According to participants in the group’s meetings, Bush is a strong advocate of the Aqaba pipeline project (see January 14, 1984) and other aspects of the Reagan administration’s covert tilt towards Iraq. [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: US Department of Defense, George Herbert Walker Bush
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
Late January 1984: US Official Meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister to Discuss Details of US Arms Deals
Tariq Aziz. [Source: BBC]Assistant Secretary of State Richard Murphy, the author of a secret policy memo detailing the administration’s new and covert military support for Iraq (see January 14, 1984), meets with Iraq’s Foreign Minister, Tariq Aziz, in Baghdad. Murphy later describes Aziz as wearing olive-green fatigues, clenching a Cuban cigar between his teeth, and sporting a pearl-handled revolver. Aziz welcomes the covert arms supplies from the US, and is particularly interested in the proposed construction of an oil pipeline to run from Iraq to Jordan, very near the Israeli border. However, mindful of the recent destruction of Iraq’s nuclear facility at Osirak by the Israelis (see June 7, 1981), Aziz insists that the US help finance the pipeline, both with government funds and private participation. Murphy agrees that the project is invaluable both in a geopolitical and an economic sense, and says he will so inform his Washington superiors. Murphy gingerly raises the question of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons against Iranian troops (see 1982), but Aziz denies any such usages. Murphy doesn’t press the issue, but says that Iraq must, according to Murphy, “eliminate doubts in the international community by making their positions and explanations as clear and understandable to the international public as the allegations have been.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: Tariq Aziz, Richard W. Murphy
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
George Shultz.[Source: Massachusetts Institute of Technology]US Secretary of Defense Lawrence Eagleburger meets with Iraqi diplomat Ismet Kattani to minimize the damage that the State Department’s March 5 condemnation (see March 5, 1984) of Iraqi chemical warfare has caused to US-Iraqi relations. Secretary of State George Shultz is also present and later sends a cable to embassies in the Middle East with a summary of the meeting. “Eagleburger began the discussion by taking Kittani aside to emphasize the central message he wanted him to take back: our policy of firm opposition to the prohibited use of CW [chemical weapons] wherever it occurs necessitated our March 5 statement condemning Iraq’s use of CW,” the note explains. “The statement was not intended to provide fuel for Khomeini’s propaganda war, nor to imply a shift in US policy toward Iran and Iraq. The US will continue its efforts to help prevent an Iranian victory, and earnestly wishes to continue the progress in its relations with Iraq. The Secretary [Shultz] then entered and reiterated these points.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/1984 ; NEW YORK TIMES, 12/23/2003]
Entity Tags: Lawrence Eagleburger, George Shultz, Said Rajaie Khorassani
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
Iran presents a draft resolution to the UN which condemns Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. The US delegate to the UN is instructed to push for a “no decision” on the resolution, or if not possible, cast an abstaining vote. Iraq’s ambassador meets with the US ambassador to the UN, Jeane Kirkpatrick, and asks for “restraint” in responding to the issue of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. [BATTLE, 2/25/2003]
Entity Tags: Jeane Kirkpatrick, United Nations
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
The US State Department briefs Donald Rumsfeld, who is preparing to make another visit to Baghdad (see March 26, 1984). In a memo to Rumsfeld, Secretary of State George Shultz laments that relations with Iraq have soured because of the State Department’s March 5 condemnation (see March 5, 1984) of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons and expresses considerable concern over the future of the Aqaba pipeline project [to be built by Bechtel (see December 2, 1983)] which the US is pushing. Shultz writes: “Two event have worsened the atmosphere in Baghdad since your last stop there in December: (1) Iraq has only partly repulsed the initial thrust of a massive Iranian invasion, losing the strategically significant Majnun Island oil fields and accepting heavy casualties; (2) Bilateral relations were sharply set back by our March 5 condemnation of Iraq for CW [chemical weapons] use, despite our repeated warnings that this issue would emerge [as a public issue] sooner or later. Given its wartime preoccupations and its distress at our CW statement, the Iraqi leadership probably will have little interest in discussing Lebanon, the Arab-Israeli conflict, or other matters except as they may impinge on Iraq’s increasingly desperate struggle for survival. If Saddam or Tariq Aziz receives you against consider, and to reject, a pending application from Westinghouse to participate in a $160 million portion of a $1 billion Hyundai thermal power plant project in Iraq, this decision will only confirm Iraqi perceptions that ExIm [Export-Import Bank] financing for the Aqaba pipeline is out of the question. Eagleburger tried to put this perception to a rest, however, emphasizing to Kittani the administration’s firm support for the line (see March 15, 1984). The door is not yet closed to ExIm or other USG [US government] financial assistance to this project….” At the very end of the cable, it is noted that “Iraq officials have professed to be at a loss to explain our actions as measured against our stated objectives. As with our CW statement, their temptation is to give up rational analysis and retreat to the line that US policies are basically anti-Arab and hostage to the desires of Israel.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/24/1984 ; VALLETTE, 3/24/2003]
Entity Tags: George Shultz, Donald Rumsfeld, Lawrence Eagleburger, Elda James, Esq.
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
During a meeting in Jordan, Iraqi diplomat Kizam Hamdoon and US diplomat James Placke discuss a proposed draft resolution that Iran presented to the UN Security Council (see Mid-March 1984) calling on the international body to condemn Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. Hamdoon tells Placke that Iraq would prefer a Security Council presidential statement in lieu of a resolution, adding that the statement should (1) “mention former resolutions of the war”; (2) include a “strong call for progress toward ending the war through ceasefire or negotiations”; and (3) not identify any specific country as responsible for chemical weapons use. Placke says that he will honor the request but asks that Iraq halt its purchasing of chemical weapons from US suppliers so as not to “embarrass” the US. Placke also warns that the US would be implementing licensing requirements on five chemical compounds for both Iraq and Iran. Placke says that the US does not want to be the “source of supply for anything that could contribute to the production of CW,” but adds reassuringly that the US does “not want this issue to dominate our bilateral relationship.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 4/6/1984 ; VALLETTE, 3/24/2003]
Entity Tags: Kizam Hamdoon, United Nations, James Placke
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
During a State Department press conference, reporters raise the issue of US relations with Iraq and the latter’s use of chemical weapons. A reporter asks, “Has there been any export of these chemicals [referring to agents used for the production of chemical weapons] from the US to Iran or Iraq at all in the past, in the recent past?” The spokesperson responds, “No, we do not have reason to believe that exports from the United States have been used by either Iran or Iraq in this connection.” Later in the press briefing, a reporter asks, “In light of your finding that Iraq has used nerve gas and/or other forms of chemical warfare, does this have any effect on US recent initiatives to expand commercial relationships with Iraq across a broad range, and also a willingness to open diplomatic relations?” The spokesperson answers, “No. I’m not aware of any change in our position. We’re interested in being involved in a closer dialogue with Iraq.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/31/1984 ]
Entity Tags: US Department of State
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
US President Ronald Reagan issues presidential directive NSDD 139, titled, “Measures to improve US posture and readiness to respond to developments in the Iran-Iraq War.” The directive stresses the importance of ensuring US access to military facilities in the Gulf region and preventing “an Iraqi collapse.” Though the directive says that the US should maintain its policy of “unambiguous” condemnation of chemical warfare—without mentioning Iraq—the document also emphasizes that the US should “place equal stress on the urgent need to dissuade Iran from continuing the ruthless and inhumane tactics which have characterized recent offensives.” The directive does not suggest ending or reducing US support for Iraq. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/30/1984 ; BATTLE, 2/25/2003]
A Department of State memo from the special adviser to the secretary on nonproliferation policy and nuclear energy affairs titled “US Dual-Use Exports to Iraq: Specific Actions,” states that the government is reviewing its policy for “the sale of certain categories of dual-use items to Iraqi nuclear entities” and the review’s “preliminary results favor expanding such trade to include Iraqi nuclear entities.” [DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 5/9/1984 ]
A Defense Intelligence Agency report concludes that Iraq will probably “continue to develop its formidable conventional and chemical capability, and probably pursue nuclear weapons.” [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/31/1984 ]
Entity Tags: Defense Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Reagan and Bush administrations’ Commerce Departments allow US companies and the US Centers for Disease Control and Prevention to export chemical and biological agents as well as other dual-use items to Iraq, despite the country’s known record of using chemical weapons. According to government regulations, the Commerce Department must send applications for export licenses which involve items related to national security to the appropriate US government agencies for review. Reviewing agencies include the State Department, Department of Defense, Energy Department, and Subgroup on Nuclear Export Coordination. But in many cases, the Commerce Department either does not send national security-related applications to these agencies for review, or if it does, it overrides a review agency’s recommendation not to grant a license, allowing the item to be exported anyway. [TIMMERMAN, 1991, PP. 202, 410;JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 79] According to two Senate Committee Reports that will be completed in 1994, one on May 25 and another on October 7, dual-use chemical and biological agents exported to Iraq from the US significantly contributed to the country’s weapons arsenal. The initial May report will say the agents “were not attenuated or weakened and were capable of reproduction” and the October report will reveal that the “microorganisms exported by the United States were identical to those the United Nations inspectors found and removed from the Iraqi biological warfare program.” The 1994 investigation also determines that other exports such as plans and equipment also contributed significantly to Iraq’s military capabilities. “UN inspectors had identified many United States manufactured items that had been exported from the United States to Iraq under licenses issued by the Department of Commerce, and established] that these items were used to further Iraq’s chemical and nuclear weapons development and its missile delivery system development program,” Donald Riegle, the chairman of the committee, will explain. He also says that between January 1985 and August 1990, the “executive branch of our government approved 771 different export licenses for sale of dual-use technology to Iraq.” [US CONGRESS, 5/25/1994; US CONGRESS, 5/25/1994; US CONGRESS, 10/7/1994; COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002; LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002]
Biological and chemical agents - Bacillus Anthracis, cause of anthrax. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Clostridium Botulinum, a source of botulinum toxin. It was sold to Iraq right up until 1992. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Histoplasma Capsulatam, cause of a disease attacking lungs, brain, spinal cord and heart. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002] Brucella Melitensis, a bacteria that can damage major organs. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Clotsridium Perfringens, a highly toxic bacteria causing systemic illness, gas gangrene. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Clostridium tetani, highly toxigenic. [COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002; SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Also, Escherichia Coli (E.Coli); genetic materials; human and bacterial DNA.[COUNTERPUNCH, 8/20/2002] VX nerve gas. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002] Pralidoxine, an antidote to nerve gas which can also be reverse engineered to create actual nerve gas. This was sold to Iraq in March 1992, after the end of the Gulf War. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Other exports - Chemical warfare-agent production facility plans and technical drawings.[NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002] Chemical warfare filling equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002] Missile fabrication equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002] Missile system guidance equipment. [NEWSDAY, 12/13/2002] Graphics terminals to design and analyze rockets. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991] Machine tools and lasers to extend ballistic missile range. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991] Computers to develop ballistic missiles and nuclear weapons. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991] $1 million in computers, flight simulators and other technology products that went to Saad 16 research center in Iraq (see November 1986). [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991]
Entity Tags: US Congress, US Department of Commerce, Bush administration, Reagan administration, Donald Riegle
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
The Reagan administration formally restores diplomatic relations with Iraq. The US had broken off relations with Iraq in 1967. Administration officials, who are already involved in secretly supplying military aid to Iraq for use against Iran (seeOctober 1983), ignore allegations that Iraq is using lethal chemical weapons against Iranian troops, including mustard gas and fungal poisons. Administration officials will later claim that no one had any idea that those allegations were true, but according to a government official, the administration has indeed known of the Iraqis’ use of chemical weapons for over a year by this time. Officials have privately chided Iraq for its use of such weapons, but Reagan officials continue to press forward with the administration’s agenda of increased economic and military cooperation even though the Iraqis ignore the US’s protests against the use of chemical weapons. [NEW YORK TIMES, 3/6/1984; NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; BATTLE, 2/25/2003]
Albert Wohlstetter introduces Ahmed Chalabi to Richard Perle, undersecretary of defense for international-security policy. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002]
US Secretary of State George Shultz successfully convinces Rep. Howard Berman (D-CA) to drop a House bill that would have put Iraq back on the State Department’s list of states that sponsor terrorism. Shultz’s argument is that the United States is actively engaged in “diplomatic dialogue on this and other sensitive issues.” He asserts that “Iraq has effectively distanced itself from international terrorism” and insists that if the US discovers any evidence implicating Iraq in the support of terrorist groups, the US government “would promptly return Iraq to the list.” [JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 54]
Entity Tags: George Shultz, Howard Berman
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
)
Map showing the strike radii of various Iraqi ballistic missiles.[Source: CIA] (click image to enlarge)US intelligence learns that Iraq’s Saad 16 research center is attempting to develop ballistic missiles. This information is relayed by the Defense Department’s Undersecretary for Trade Security Policy, Stephen Bryen, to the Commerce Department’s (CD) Assistant Secretary for Trade Administration. In spite of this, the Commerce Department will subsequently approve more than $1 million in computer sales to the Iraqi research center over the next four years. In 1991, the House Committee on Government Operations will report that 40 percent of the equipment at the Saad 16 research center had come from the US. [WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991; US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
Entity Tags: US Department of Commerce, Stephen Bryen
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Late November 1986: Iran-Contra Scandal Will Not Affect US-Iraq Intelligence Link, Says CIA Director
Shortly after the Iran-Contra scandal is first revealed in the press, CIA Director William J. Casey meets with Iraq’s ambassador to the United States, Nizar Hamdoon, a second time (see October 1986) and assures him that the new Washington-Baghdad intelligence link (see August 1986) will remain open.[WASHINGTON POST, 12/15/1986]
Entity Tags: William Casey, Central Intelligence Agency, Kizam Hamdoon
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s, Iran-Contra Affair
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
Neoconservative academics and authors Laurie Mylroie and Daniel Pipes write an article for the New Republic entitled “Back Iraq: Time for a US Tilt in the Mideast.” Mylroie and Pipes argue that the US must publicly embrace Saddam Hussein’s secular dictatorship as a bulwark against the Islamic fundamentalism of Iran. Backing Iraq “could lay the basis for a fruitful relationship” that would benefit US and Israeli interests, they write. They believe Washington should move to a closer relationship with Hussein because Iraq holds a more moderate view of Israel and the US than other countries in the Middle East. “The American weapons that Iraq could make good use of include remotely scatterable and anti-personnel mines and counterartillery radar.” Mylroie and Pipes argue not just for weapons sales to Iraq, but for the US to share intelligence with that nation: “The United States might also consider upgrading intelligence it is supplying Baghdad.” Mylroie and Pipes are apparently uninterested in the stories of Hussein’s use of chemical weapons against both Iranians and his own citizens (see March 5, 1984,March 1988, and August 25, 1988). After the 9/11 attacks, Mylroie will change her opinion and join the call for Hussein’s overthrow, blaming him for a raft of terror attacks going back to the 1993 World Trade Center bombing (see 1990, October 2000, and September 12, 2001). [NEW REPUBLIC, 4/27/1987 ; COUNTERPUNCH, 8/13/2003;ISIKOFF AND CORN, 2006, PP. 68]
Entity Tags: Laurie Mylroie, Daniel Pipes
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s, Neoconservative Influence
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
One batch each of salmonella and E coli is sent to the Iraqi State Company for Drug Industries with the approval of the US Department of Commerce. [SUNDAY HERALD (GLASGOW), 9/8/2002]
Entity Tags: US Department of Commerce
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
The US increases the amount of military intelligence it provides Iraq, a significant portion of which is channeled to the Iraqis through the CIA’s Baghdad office.[WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
Entity Tags: Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
The US provides Baghdad with $500 million in credits to buy American farm products. [WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/10/2002]
The US Commerce Department allows the export of equipment to Iraq for its SCUD missile program, allowing the Iraqis to increase the range of its SCUD missiles. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
Entity Tags: US Department of Commerce
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
According to several accounts, Iraq uses US-supplied Bell helicopters to deploy chemical weapons during its campaign to recapture lost territories in its war with Iran. One of the towns that is within the conflict zone is the Kurdish village of Halabja, with a population of about 70,000. Between 3,200 and 5,000 Halabja civilians are reportedly killed by poison gas (see August 25, 1988). Other accounts, however, suggest that Iranian gas is responsible for the attack on Halabja, a version that is promoted by the Reagan administration in order to divert the blame away from Iraq. Some believe the US version of the Halabja massacre is “cooked up in the Pentagon.” A declassified State Department document “demonstrate[s] that US diplomats received instructions to press this line with US allies, and to decline to discuss the details.” [US DEPARTMENT OF THE NAVY, 12/10/1990;LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2/13/1991; WASHINGTON POST, 3/11/1991; INTERNATIONAL HERALD TRIBUNE, 1/17/2003; NEW YORK TIMES, 1/31/2003]
Entity Tags: Bell Helicopter, Reagan administration
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
A US delegation travels to Turkey at the request of the US Senate Foreign Relations Committee and confirms that Iraq is “using chemical weapons on its Kurdish population.” [US CONGRESS, 10/1988]
Entity Tags: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
The United Nations sends a delegation of experts to the Iraq-Iran War conflict zone to investigate Iraq’s use of chemical weapons. [JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 76]However, Baghdad refuses to cooperate and the US makes no serious attempt to press Baghdad to comply with the UN Security Council’s decision. US Secretary of State George Shultz downplays the charges against Iraq, arguing that interviews with Kurdish refugees in Turkey and “other sources” do not conclusively support the allegations being made against Saddam Hussein’s government. [NATION, 8/26/2002]
Entity Tags: George Shultz, Saddam Hussein, United Nations Security Council
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Kurds gassed in Halabja. [Source: PersianEye / Corbis]Days after the end of the Iran-Iraq War (see August 20, 1988), Saddam Hussein begins the first of a series of poison-gas attacks on Kurdish villages inside Iraq. A September 1988 report by the Senate Foreign Relations Committee states: “Those who were very close to the bombs died instantly. Those who did not die instantly found it difficult to breathe and began to vomit. The gas stung the eyes, skin, and lungs of the villagers exposed to it. Many suffered temporary blindness… . Those who could not run from the growing smell, mostly the very old and the very young, died.” While the gas attacks are continuing, Deputy Secretary of State John Whitehead circulates a highly classified memo among senior State Department officials recommending that the US cultivate even closer ties with Iraq, whom it supported over Iran in the last few years of the war (see Early October-November, 1986). Whitehead offers a Cold War rationale: “[Soviet] clout and influence is on a steady rise as the Gulf Arabs gain self-confidence and Soviet diplomacy gains in sophistication. The Soviets have strong cards to play: their border with Iran and their arms-supply relationship with Iraq. They will continue to be major players and we should engage them as fully as possible.” Whitehead adds, “It should be remembered… that we have weathered Irangate” (see January 17, 1986). More must be done to develop closer ties with “the ruthless but pragmatic Saddam Hussein.” (Also seeSeptember 8, 1988.) [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, John Whitehead, Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
The US grants 65 licenses for dual-use technology exports for Iraq. On average, the US is now granting 260 such licenses per year, more than double the rate of licenses granted between January and August 1988. [JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 38]
Veteran diplomat Joseph Wilson arrives in Baghdad to assume the post of Deputy Chief of Mission (DCM) under US Ambassador April Glaspie. Wilson has extensive experience throughout sub-Saharan and Central Africa, as well as brief stints on the staffs of Senator Al Gore (D-TN) and Representative Tom Foley (D-WA). Wilson will later write that he and his colleagues share the belief that Iraq is ruled by “a shockingly brutal regime… an ugly totalitarian dictatorship” and its leader, Saddam Hussein, a “sociopath.” For the next three years, Wilson and his colleagues will send harsh reports of Hussein’s systematic violations of the human rights of his subjects to Washington.
Walking a Fine Line between Isolation and Appeasement - Still, most of the embassy staff, including Wilson and Glaspie, are not advocates of totally isolating Hussein with extreme economic and diplomatic sanctions. Wilson will write, “Isolating a regime often results in isolating ourselves, and we then lose any leverage we might have to influence outcomes. On the other hand, when dictators are treated like any other leaders, it’s often interpreted by them as a free pass to continue in their autocratic ways, while critics label it as appeasement.… The merits of ideologically driven diplomacy versus a more pragmatic approach have been a recurring theme of foreign policy debates throughout the history of international relations and America’s own domestic policies.”
'Tread Lightly' - Wilson will note that “Iraq’s Arab neighbors unanimously urged us to tread lightly. They argued that after almost a decade of a grinding war with Iran, Saddam had learned his lesson and that his natural radicalism would now be tempered by the harsh experience.… [I]t was better to tie him to relationships that would be hard for him to jettison than to leave him free to make trouble with no encumbrances. Engaging with him at least kept him in our sights.” Iraq had behaved monstrously during its war with Iran, and had offended the world with its chemical attacks on its own citizens (see August 25, 1988) and its Iranian enemies (see October 1988). But it had emerged from the war as a powerful regional player both militarily and economically. The Bush administration is torn between trying to moderate Hussein’s behavior and treating him as an incorrigible, irredeemable enemy of civilization. And Washington wants Iraq as a balancing force against Iran, which is awash in virulently anti-American sentiment (a sentiment returned in full by many American lawmakers and government officials). No other country in the Gulf region will tolerate the presence of US forces as a counterbalance to Iran. So, as Wilson will write, “All of Iraq’s neighbors continued to argue for a softer approach; and since they clearly had at least as much at stake as we did, the Bush administration was willing to follow their lead.”[WILSON, 2004, PP. 78-79, 451]
Entity Tags: Joseph C. Wilson, Saddam Hussein, April Glaspie
Category Tags: Desert Shield/Desert Storm, Iraq Invasion of Kuwait, US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
In a memo regarding the issue of Iraq’s use of chemical weapons, Assistant Secretary of State Richard W. Murphy writes, “The US-Iraqi relationship is… important to our long term political and economic objectives. We believe that economic sanctions will be useless or counterproductive to influence the Iraqis.”[WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002]
Entity Tags: Richard W. Murphy, US Department of State
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
The US Senate unanimously passes the Prevention of Genocide Act of 1988, which makes Iraq ineligible to receive US loans, military and non-military assistance, credits, credit guarantees and items subject to export controls. It also makes it illegal for the US to import Iraqi oil. [US CONGRESS, 9/8/1988; JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 78]Immediately after the bill is passed by the Senate, the Reagan administration launches a campaign to prevents its passage in the House. With the help of its allies in the House, the administration succeeds in killing the bill on the last day of the legislative session. [JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 78; NEW YORK TIMES, 2/13/2003]
Entity Tags: Reagan administration
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
The US Senate Foreign Relations Committee confirms reports that between 1984 and 1988 “Iraq repeatedly and effectively used poison gas on Iran.” [US CONGRESS, 10/1988]
Entity Tags: Senate Foreign Relations Committee
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Rep. Henry Gonzalez (D-TX) states that in spite of the CIA and the Bush administration’s knowledge that Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) was “involved in Iraq’s clandestine nuclear, chemical, and biological weapons programs and missile programs… the Bush administration [approved] dozens of export licenses that [allowed] United States and foreign firms to ship sophisticated US dual-use equipment to MIMI-controlled weapons factories.” [US CONGRESS, 8/10/1992]
Entity Tags: Iraq Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization, Bush administration, Central Intelligence Agency, Henry Gonzalez
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
The US learns that the Iraqi research center, Saad 16, is involved in the development of chemical and nuclear weapons. Three years earlier it had been discovered that the facility was developing ballistic missiles (see November 1986). The Commerce Department will continue to ship advanced technology products to the center. [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
Entity Tags: US Department of Commerce
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, a Jordanian-born Palestinian, travels to Afghanistan in 1989 and fights against the pro-Soviet government there. He becomes a radical Islamist and reportedly trains at an al-Qaeda training camp there. He forms a militant group later known as al-Tawhid. In 1993, he returns to Jordan but is quickly arrested for possessing grenades and is sentenced to 15 years in prison. But he gathers many followers inside the prison and is connected to growing Jordanian radical militant networks outside the prison. In May 1999, Abdullah II becomes the new king of Jordan and al-Zarqawi is released from prison as part of a general amnesty. [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 6/8/2006] In late 1999, al-Zarqawi is allegedly involved in an unsuccessful attempt to blow up the Radisson SAS Hotel in Amman, Jordan (see November 30, 1999). [GUARDIAN, 10/9/2002; INDEPENDENT, 2/6/2003; WASHINGTON POST, 2/7/2003] By the end of 1999, he returns to Afghanistan and meets bin Laden. However, bin Laden reportedly strongly dislikes him, because al-Zarqawi comes across as too ambitious, abrasive, and overbearing, and has differing ideological views. But another al-Qaeda laeder, Saif al-Adel, sees potential and convinces bin Laden to give a token $5,000 to set up his own training camp near the town of Herat, close to the border with Iran. He begins setting up the camp in early 2000 (see Early 2000-December 2001). [ATLANTIC MONTHLY, 6/8/2006]
Entity Tags: Osama bin Laden, Abu Musab al-Zarqawi, Al-Tawhid, Saif al-Adel
Timeline Tags: Complete 911 Timeline
Category Tags: Alleged Al-Qaeda Ties, Al Zarqawi Allegation
Iraq continues to meddle in the affairs of Lebanon as a method of seeking revenge against Syria for refusing to support Iraq in its war with Iran. Syria is in the process of seizing control of Lebanon and imposing military force to quell the fighting between the warring Lebanese factions, and Iraq has tried numerous times to interfere with Syria’s activities in Lebanon. Iraq earns the ire of the US when it tries to ship surface-to-surface missiles into Beirut through the Jordanian port of Aqaba. Such missiles deployed in an urban environment such as Beirut would drastically increase the level of violence throughout Lebanon. The US ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, meets with Iraqi officials daily in the US’s attempt to dissuade the Iraqis from arming Lebanese Prime Minister Michel Aoun and his Maronite Christian faction, in Aoun’s losing struggle against Syria. Glaspie points out that Aoun is a friend of Israel, and by arming Aoun, Iraq is placing itself in a tacit alliance with Israel. Joseph Wilson, Glaspie’s deputy, will later write, “For the Iraqis, of course, it had nothing to do with Israel, or Aoun’s position in Lebanon; it had everything to do with giving Syrian President Hafiz al-Assad a bloody nose and using Beirut as the cudgel with which to bash him. For the Iraqis, the road from Baghdad to Damascus went through Beirut.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 88-89]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, April Glaspie, Bush administration, Michel Aoun, Joseph C. Wilson, Hafiz al-Assad
Category Tags: Iraq Invasion of Kuwait, US-Iraq Collaboration
Secretary of State James Baker receives a memo from the State Department informing him that Iraq is aggressively developing chemical and biological weapons, as well as new missiles. In spite of this disturbing intelligence, the memo also instructs Baker to express the administration’s “interest in broadening US-Iraqi ties” to Iraqi Undersecretary Kizam Hamdoon. [US DEPARTMENT OF STATE, 3/24/1989]
Entity Tags: Kizam Hamdoon, James A. Baker, US Department of State
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Mohammed Said Nabulsi, Jordan’s central bank governor, orders the country’s banks to deposit 30 percent of their foreign exchange holdings with the central bank. The measure is part of an effort to enforce regulations on liquidity ratios and reduce the outflow of foreign exchange from Jordan. Petra, run by Ahmed Chalabi, is the only bank among the 20 that is unable to comply with the order. At the urging of Nabulsi, King Hussein puts Petra under government supervision and orders an audit of the bank’s books. Petra’s board of directors are replaced and an investigation begins. Two weeks later, in August 1989, Chalabi flees the country—reportedly with $70 million. According to Hudson Institute’s Max Singer, Prince Hassan personally drives Chalabi to the Jordanian border, helping him escape. The investigation subsequently uncovers evidence of massive fraud. “The scale of fraud at Petra Bank was enormous,” Nabulsi will later recall. “It was like a tiny Enron.” Arthur Andersen determines that the bank’s assets are overstated by $200 million. The bank is found to have enormous bad debts (about $80 million); “unsupported foreign currency balances at counter-party banks” (about $20 million); and money purportedly owed to the bank which could not be found (about $60 million). Millions of dollars of depositors’ money had been routed to the Chalabi family empire in Switzerland, Lebanon, and London, in the form of loans that had not been repaid. The Chalabi family’s Swiss and Lebanese firms, Mebco and Socofi, are later put into liquidation. As a result of the fraud, the Jordanian government is forced to pay $200 million to depositors whose money had disappeared, and to avert a potential collapse of the country’s entire banking system. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; GUARDIAN, 4/14/2003; SALON, 5/4/2004;COUNTERPUNCH, 5/20/2004; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004; CHRISTIAN SCIENCE MONITOR, 6/15/2004]Chalabi later provides a different account of what happened. According to Zaab Sethna, a spokesman for the Iraqi National Congress, King Hussein of Jordan turned on Chalabi in coordination with Iraq because Chalabi was “using the bank to fund [Iraqi] opposition groups and learning a lot about illegal arms transfers to Saddam.” Petra Bank was also providing the CIA with information on the Jordanian-Iraqi trade. [AMERICAN PROSPECT, 11/18/2002; NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004]
Entity Tags: Mohammed Said Nabulsi, Hussein bin Talal, Petra Bank, Arthur Andersen,Middle East Banking Corp., Ahmed Chalabi
Category Tags: Chalabi and the INC
President Bush signs National Security Directive (NSD) 26, which asserts: “Access to Persian Gulf oil and the security of key friendly states in the area are vital to US national security. The United States remains committed to defend its vital interests in the region, if necessary and appropriate through the use of US military force, against the Soviet Union or any other regional power with interests inimical to our own. The United States also remains committed to support the individual and collective self-defense of friendly countries in the area to enable them to play a more active role in their own defense and thereby reduce the necessity for unilateral US military intervention.”
Policy on Iraq, Iran - NSD 26 is intended to promote the US’s outreach to Iraq as a counterweight to the “inimical” Gulf nation of Iran. The directive states, “Normal relations between the US and Iraq would serve our longer-term interests and promote stability in both the Gulf and the Middle East. The United States government should propose economic and political incentives for Iraq to moderate its behavior and to increase our influence with Iraq.” The directive also warns that Iraq would face “economic and political sanctions” if it continued to pursue biological and chemical weapons, and “[a]ny breach by Iraq of IAEA safeguards in its nuclear program will result in a similar response.”
Human Rights - The directive advocates making “[h]uman rights considerations” an “important element in our policy towards Iraq,” and states that Iraq should be steered away from “its meddling in external affairs, such as in Lebanon, and be encouraged to play a constructive role in negotiating a settlement with Iran and cooperating in the Middle East peace process.” The directive takes a much harder line on Iran, noting that before it can expect normalized relations with the US, it must “cease its support for international terrorism… help obtain the release of all American hostages… hal[t] its subversive activities…,” seek peaceful co-existence with Iraq, and “improv[e] its human rights practices.” [NATIONAL SECURITY DIRECTIVE 26, 10/2/1989 ; WILSON, 2004, PP. 81-82]
Entity Tags: Bush administration, George Herbert Walker Bush
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
James A. Baker.[Source: Library of Congress]By this date, all international banks have cut off loans to Iraq. Notwithstanding, President Bush, ignoring warnings from his own departments about the alarming buildup of the Iraqi military and Iraq’s continued development of weapons of mass destruction (see June 1989 and September 1989), signs the secret National Security Directive 26 establishing closer ties to the Baghdad regime and providing $1 billion in agricultural loan guarantees to that government. These funds allow Iraq to continue its development of weapons of mass destruction. Four days later, Secretary of State James Baker meets with Iraqi Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz and promises that the US will not curb restrictions on high-technology exports to Iraq. Baker is ignoring the CIA’s warnings that Iraq is using some of this technology to develop a nuclear weapon. The State Department’s minutes of the Baker-Aziz meeting reads in part, “[T]he Secretary admitted that the US does have concerns about proliferation, but they are worldwide concerns.” [US PRESIDENT, 10/2/1989; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 2/23/1992; NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; WALL STREET JOURNAL, 7/10/2002]
Entity Tags: James A. Baker, Central Intelligence Agency, US Department of State,George Herbert Walker Bush, Tariq Aziz
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Clayton Yeutter. [Source: Wally McNamee / Corbis]Secretary of State James Baker calls Agriculture Secretary Clayton Yeutter and demands that the Agriculture Department authorize a billion dollars in new loans for Iraq, even though that department, and others, want to limit or eliminate any funding to Iraq. Baker’s demand is sparked in part by the refusal of international bankers to loan Iraq any more money (seeOctober 2-6, 1989). [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: James A. Baker, Clayton Yeutter, US Department of Agriculture
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
CIA Director William Webster meets with Kuwait’s head of security, Brigadier Fahd Ahmed al-Fahd. Iraq will claim after its invasion and occupation of Kuwait (seeAugust 2, 1990) that it had located a Kuwaiti memorandum summarizing their conversation, a memo both the CIA and Kuwaiti government officials will claim is a forgery, though both sides will admit the meeting actually took place. Iraq will accuse the CIA and Kuwait of collaborating to destabilize Iraq’s economy and government (see Late August, 1990). The memo reads in part: “We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level.” [NATIONMASTER, 12/23/2007]
Entity Tags: William H. Webster, Central Intelligence Agency, Fahd Ahmed al-Fahd
Category Tags: Pre-war Attacks against Iraq, Iraq Invasion of Kuwait
Kuwait’s Director General of State Security sends a memo to the Minister of the Interior summarizing a meeting with CIA Director William Webster. He writes: “We agreed with the American side that it was important to take advantage of the deteriorating economic situation in Iraq in order to put pressure on that country’s government to delineate our common border. The Central Intelligence Agency gave us its view of appropriate means of pressure, saying that broad cooperation should be initiated between us on condition that such activities be coordinated at a high level.” When Iraq invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), Iraqi officials find this memo and confront the Kuwaiti foreign minister with it during an Arab summit meeting in mid-August 1990. Upon seeing the memo, the Kuwaiti official reportedly faints. [AHMED, 10/2/2001] The US claims the memo is a forgery.[OFFICE OF GLOBAL COMMUNICATIONS, 1/21/2003 ]
Entity Tags: William H. Webster, Central Intelligence Agency
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Iraq Invasion of Kuwait
In response to a US company’s concern that their product might be used by Iraq to develop nuclear weapons and ballistic missiles, the US Department of Commerce asks Iraq’s government to provide a written guarantee that the company’s product will be used for civilian purposes only. The Commerce Department tells the company that a license and review is unnecessary, and that there is no reason why the product in question should not be exported to Iraq.[JENTLESON, 1994, PP. 110]
Entity Tags: US Department of Commerce
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Jordanian investigators spend 45 days in the US looking for hidden assets belonging to a Washington, DC subsidiary of Petra Bank, a Chalabi-controlled enterprise that collapsed in 1989 (see August 2, 1989). Nearly all of the US assets listed in Petra Bank’s books turn out to be worthless, with the notable exception of an auxiliary office where valuable bank records are presumably kept. The “office” is a country estate with a swimming pool in upscale Middleburg, Virginia. It belongs to the Chalabi family, which had been charging the bank a monthly rent. “There was not one business record in the whole place,” an official will later recall. [NEW YORKER, 6/7/2004]
A study written by research analysts at the US Army War College’s Strategic Studies Institute concludes: “Baghdad should not be expected to deliberately provoke military confrontations with anyone. Its interests are best served now and in the immediate future by peace…. Revenues from oil sales could put it in the front ranks of nations economically…. Force is only likely if the Iraqis feel seriously threatened…. It is our belief that Iraq is basically committed to a non-aggressive strategy and that it will, over the course of the next few years, considerably reduce the size of its military. Economic conditions practically mandate such action.” [PELLETIERE, JOHNSON, AND ROSENBERGER, 1990, PP. 41; GANNETT NEWS SERVICE, 10/18/2002]
Iraqi opposition leader Ahmed Chalabi, already forging ties with the CIA and positioning himself to take over from Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein (see May 1991and 1992-1996), is also strengthening his position with the Iranian government. A CIA case officer later says that while he cannot be sure exactly when Chalabi began reaching out to Iran, he “was given safe houses and cars in [Kurdish-controlled] northern Iraq, and was letting them be used by agents from the Iranian Ministry of Intelligence and Security [VEVAK], and the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps.” [SALON, 5/5/2004; UNGER, 2007, PP. 125-126]
Speaking before the Senate Armed Services Committee, CIA Director William Webster acknowledges the West’s increasing dependency on Middle East oil. “I want to mention two key Middle East related issues that will continue to have a major impact on US interests,” he tells senators. “[One] Oil. Western dependence on Persian Gulf oil will rise dramatically. By the year 2000, gulf states will supply an estimated 40 percent of Western oil, up from about 30 percent today. Meanwhile, US dependence is expected to rise from about 10 percent to roughly 25 percent by the end of the decade. [Two] The Arab-Israeli peace process. If the peace process does not advance over the next several years, the Intifadah is likely to become more violent, terrorism will probably rise, and Arab pressure on the United States to impose a settlement will increase.” [US CONGRESS, 1/23/1990]
General Norman Schwarzkopf says in a testimony before the Senate Committee on Armed Services: “Middle East oil is the West’s lifeblood. It fuels us today and being 77 percent of the Free World’s proven oil reserves, is going to fuel us when the rest of the world has run dry…. Our allies are even more dependent on Middle East oil. Japan gets almost two-thirds of its oil from the area while our allies in Europe import over one quarter.” [US CONGRESS, 2/8/1990]
April 1990: Hussein Threatens to ‘Burn Half of Israel;’ Bush Continues to Allow Iraq to Develop WMDs
Saddam Hussein, emboldened by President Bush’s continued support for his regime even as he develops chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons (seeSeptember 1989) and is gassing his own citizens (see August 25, 1988), boasts that he now has chemical weapons and will “burn half of Israel.” Additionally, Iraqi forces on manuevers in the southern part of the country are being told that they are training to attack Israel. Nevertheless, the White House blocks efforts by the Commerce Department to stop the flow of US technology to Iraq, even technology that is being used to develop weapons of mass destruction (see 1990and July 18, 1990-August 1, 1990). One White House official explains, “The president does not want to single out Iraq.” US diplomat Joseph Wilson, the deputy chief of mission in Baghdad (see September 5, 1988 and After), will later write: “While we were concerned about the tensions in Iraq’s relations with Kuwait (see May 28-30, 1990 and July 17, 1990), we did not suspect that the southern military exercises were, in fact, a first signal of Iraq’s intention to invade that country. We were more worried that Saddam’s hard line toward Israel would further inflame Arab passions and contribute to making any lasting settlement between Israel and the Palestinians that much more difficult to achieve.” [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992; WILSON, 2004, PP. 95]
Entity Tags: US Department of Commerce, Joseph C. Wilson, George Herbert Walker Bush, Saddam Hussein, Bush administration
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: Iraq Invasion of Kuwait, US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Alan Simpson. [Source: Britt Bolen]A delegation of US senators meets with Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein to deliver a message from President Bush. The delegation is led by Robert Dole (R-KS) and includes Frank Murkowski (R-AK), Jim McClure (R-ID), Alan Simpson (R-WY), and Howard Metzenbaum (D-OH). The senators are joined by US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie, her deputy Joseph Wilson, and various embassy staffers. Dole delivers the message from Bush: Iraq must abandon its chemical and biological weapons programs and stockpiles, and, in return, the US will continue working to improve relations between the two countries (see July 27, 1990 and July 25, 1990). In response, Hussein says he is not trying to destabilize the region and work against US interests. As part of his statement, he says: “I didn’t really say I was going to set fire to half of Israel (see April 1990). What I said was that if Israel attacks me, thenI will set fire to half of Israel.” Hussein insists he will only take action against Israel if his country is attacked first, but such a response will be swift and overwhelming, with his new WMD playing a central role. He also protests against what he calls US and British efforts to contain Iraq by scaling back economic and commercial programs, and what he calls a Western smear campaign against him and his government. When the other senators are given a chance to speak to Hussein, Wilson is struck by Metzenbaum’s response. “Mr. President, I can tell you are a honorable man,” Metzenbaum says. Wilson later writes, “I remember thinking to myself that whatever beneficial impact the president’s message and Dole’s statement may have had on Saddam, it had all just been negated by this obsequious boot-licking.” Simpson joins Metzenbaum in stroking Hussein, bending forward so low from his chair that he looks as if he is on bended knee and telling the dictator: “Mr. President, I can see that what you have here isn’t really a policy problem; what you have is a public relations problem. You’ve got a problem with the haughty and pampered press. I know all about that, because I’ve got problems with the press back home. What you need is you need a good public relations person.” Wilson will write: “Saddam no doubt took from the meeting not the admonition to stop developing weapons of mass destruction and threatening his neighbors, but rather support for his own misguided belief that he was an honorable man who didn’t really have policy problems at all, just clumsy relations. After all, one of Israel’s champions had told him so, and another American leader had knelt before him to reassure him that he had no problems with the American government.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 95]
Entity Tags: Jim McClure, Alan Simpson, April Glaspie, Frank Murkowski, George Herbert Walker Bush, Howard Metzenbaum, Saddam Hussein, Robert J. Dole, Joseph C. Wilson
Category Tags: Iraq Invasion of Kuwait, US-Iraq Collaboration
The US Army presents a white paper to President Bush in which it describes Saddam Hussein’s regime in Iraq as the optimum contender “to replace the Warsaw Pact” and on that basis argues for the continuation of Cold War-level military spending. [PILGER, 1994; CLARKE, 1994; ZEPEZAUER, 2003]
Just three months before Saddam Hussein invades Kuwait (see August 2, 1990), the Bush administration is still sharing intelligence information with Iraq (seeAugust 1986). [NEW YORKER, 11/2/1992]
Entity Tags: Bush administration, Saddam Hussein
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration
In repeated statements, Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein says that overproduction of oil by Kuwait and the United Arab Emirates (UAE) is “economic warfare” against Iraq. [PBS FRONTLINE, 1/9/1996] Iraq is not merely issuing blustery allegations with no basis in fact. Iraq is virtually bankrupt and deeply in debt to both Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, which funded Iraq during the Iran-Iraq war, as well as other nations such as the US and Japan. Hussein has spent billions rebuilding his military and distributing massive amounts of consumer goods to the populace in an attempt to persuade them that Iraq won the war against Iran and is now able to spend its “war dividends.” In 1999, Kuwait defied the quotas laid down by the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) and increased its oil production by 40%. The subsequent sharp drop in oil prices drove Iraq’s economy towards catastrophe. The situation is further aggravated by Iraqi suspicions that Kuwait is deliberately “slant-drilling” oil from Iraq’s Rumaylah oil field (see July 15-17, 1990). Hussein needs a massive infusion of revenue to maintain his large standing army and the fiction of economic growth, and he looks to Kuwait as the source of that revenue. Land issues also play a part: Iraq wants to swap some territory along the border for control of two Kuwaiti-held islands across from its port at Umm Qasr, but Kuwait is unwilling to make the trade. US diplomat Joseph Wilson, the deputy chief of mission in Baghdad, describes the Iraqi outlook on Kuwait as a nation “small, rich, and despised.” All in all, the US diplomatic entourage in Baghdad is alarmed at Iraq’s preparations for war. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 93-94; NATIONMASTER, 12/23/2007]
Entity Tags: US Department of State, Joseph C. Wilson, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries, Saddam Hussein
Category Tags: Iraq Invasion of Kuwait
A 500-page report completed on behalf of the Jordanian military attorney-general charges that Ahmed Chalabi was directly responsible for the collapse of Petra Bank (see August 2, 1989). It accuses him of making “fictitious deposits and entries to make the income… appear larger; losses on shares and investments; [and] bad debts… to Abhara company and Al Rimal company.” The technical report contains 106 chapters, each of which addresses a different irregularity. Most of them are attributed to Chalabi. [GUARDIAN, 4/14/2003]
Iraq publicly accuses Kuwait of stealing oil by “slant drilling” from Iraq’s Rumaylah oil field on the Iraq-Kuwait border (see May 28-30, 1990). Iraqi government officials warn Kuwait that if the alleged theft of oil does not stop, Iraq will take military action. [PBS FRONTLINE, 1/9/1996; NATIONMASTER, 12/23/2007]
Iraqi dictator Saddam Hussein excoriates those Arab leaders whom he believes are collaborating with the US and Israel to obstruct Arab development. He accuses several unnamed Arab heads of state of being bought off with fancy houses and vehicles, and failing to stand up to Western attempts to stymie Arab ambitions. The real thrust of his criticisms is oil-based. He says that overproduction of oil and the resultant low oil prices are “a poisoned dagger” in Iraq’s back, delivered by the United Arab Emirates and Kuwait (see May 28-30, 1990). Hussein intends to use his influence with the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) to drive the price of oil from $14 to $25 and thus raise a large amount of cash to help pay off his country’s staggering debts to Japan, the US, and several European countries. Hussein intends to stop Kuwait overproduction, and he is willing to use military force to do it. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 97-98]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries
Category Tags: Iraq Invasion of Kuwait
The US Commerce Department approves $4.8 million in sales of advanced technology products to Iraq’s Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization (MIMI) and Saad 16 research centers. MIMI is known to be a development facility for chemical, biological, and nuclear weapons programs (see 1989) and Saad 16 is known to be involved in the development of chemical and nuclear weapons (seeNovember 1986 and November 1986). [US CONGRESS, 7/2/1991]
Entity Tags: US Department of Commerce, Iraq Ministry of Industry and Military Industrialization
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: US-Iraq Collaboration, Weapons of Mass Destruction
Iraq begins massing troops near the Iraq-Kuwait border in preparation for a possible attack (see August 2, 1990). [PBS FRONTLINE, 1/9/1996]
April Glaspie and Saddam Hussein.[Source: Wilson's Almanac]The US Ambassador to Iraq, April Glaspie, goes to the Iraqi Foreign Ministry to meet with Foreign Minister Tariq Aziz, to deliver a statement made earlier in the week by State Department spokesperson Margaret Tutwiler. The statement is equivocal about Iraq’s belligerent pose towards Kuwait (see July 22, 1990), noting that although the US has no mutual defense pact with Kuwait, “Iraq and others know there is no place for coercion and intimidation in the civilized world.” Deputy Chief of Mission Joseph Wilson will later describe Glaspie as having “a keen mind and a profound understanding of the issues.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 98]
One-on-One with Saddam Hussein - Shortly after her meeting with Aziz, she is summoned back to the Foreign Ministry and driven from there to a meeting with Saddam Hussein. Wilson will write: “This was unprecedented. During the two years she had been ambassador, Saddam had never held a private meeting with her, delegating all contact to Aziz or other underlings.” During the meeting, Glaspie promises Hussein that President Bush wants “better and deeper relations.” She tells Hussein that Bush is an “intelligent man,” and adds, “He is not going to declare an economic war against Iraq.” [WASHINGTON POST, 12/30/2002;LONDON TIMES, 12/31/2002; WILSON, 2004, PP. 98]
'No Opinion on Arab-Arab Conflicts' - Glaspie tells Hussein: “We have considerable sympathy for your quest for higher oil prices, the immediate cause of your confrontation with Kuwait.… We know you need funds. We understand that, and our opinion is that you should have the opportunity to rebuild your country. We can see that you have deployed massive numbers of troops in the south. Normally that would be none of our business, but when this happens in the context of your other threats against Kuwait, then it would be reasonable for us to be concerned. For this reason, I have received an instruction to ask you, in the spirit of friendship—not confrontation—regarding your intentions: Why are your troops massed so very close to Kuwait’s borders?” Hussein answers that he intends to try to negotiate a peaceful settlement with Kuwait; Glaspie asks what solutions Hussein would find acceptable. Hussein wants to keep the entire Shatt al Arab [a strategically important waterway] under Iraqi control, and if given that, he is willing to make concessions to Kuwait. However, if he has to give up some control of the Shatt, he will renounce all control in favor of bringing Kuwait back under Iraqi dominion. Glaspie replies: “We have no opinion on your Arab-Arab conflicts, such as your dispute with Kuwait. Secretary [of State James] Baker has directed me to emphasize the instruction, first given to Iraq in the 1960s, that the Kuwait issue is not associated with America.” Reportedly Hussein takes this as a green light from the US to proceed with the invasion. [NEW YORK TIMES, 9/23/1990; LOS ANGELES TIMES, 1/5/2003]
Glaspie Said to Be Scapegoated - Wilson will later write that the US policy failure that led to the invasion is not Glaspie’s fault and that she is merely made a scapegoat for it (see July 25, 1990 and After): “The one-on-one meeting with Saddam was fateful for Ambassador Glaspie. Out of it emerged the charge that she had not been tough enough with him and had somehow given him a green light to invade Kuwait. Nothing could be further from the truth.”
Charge of US Manipulation - Author and investigative producer Barry Lando will say that the price of oil was manipulated with US connivance before the crisis in an effort to hurt Iraq (see Around July 25, 1990).
Entity Tags: Tariq Aziz, Saddam Hussein, April Glaspie, Joseph C. Wilson, James A. Baker, Margaret Tutwiler
Timeline Tags: US-Iraq 1980s
Category Tags: Iraq Invasion of Kuwait, US-Iraq Collaboration
During a meeting with US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie (see July 25, 1990), Iraq dictator Saddam Hussein interrupts the meeting to take a phone call from Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak. Mubarak has worked tirelessly to mediate the burgeoning dispute between Iraq and Kuwait. After the phone call, Hussein tells Glaspie that he has just told Mubarak the same thing he told her—that he will not invade Kuwait so long as there is an active negotiating process taking place. The US later learns that Hussein asked Mubarak not to share that piece of information with Kuwait in order to keep his “bluff” alive. Mubarak apparently honors the request, because Iraq’s subsequent invasion (see August 2, 1990) is a complete surprise to Kuwait. Mubarak is reportedly infuriated at Hussein’s apparent betrayal of his trust. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 98] In 2003, Glaspie’s then-deputy, Joseph Wilson, will tell an interviewer that Hussein “lied to [Glaspie]. He lied to President Mubarak that he was going to allow the negotiating process to go forward.” [PBS, 2/28/2003] In 2004, Wilson will write: “I believe that he met with Glaspie for the express purpose of deceiving us about his intentions, as he did with… Mubarak at the same time. In this way, he maintained the element of surprise. [WILSON, 2004, PP. 123]
The deputy for US Ambassador to Iraq April Glaspie, Joseph Wilson, later writes of the fateful meeting between Glaspie and Saddam Hussein (see July 25, 1990). In his view, Glaspie will become a scapegoat, receiving unfair blame for giving Hussein tacit permission to invade Kuwait. Wilson later writes, “The one-on-one meeting with Saddam was fateful for Ambassador Glaspie. Out of it emerged the charge that she had not been tough enough with him and had somehow given him a green light to invade Kuwait. Nothing could be further from the truth. Glaspie has been made a convenient scapegoat for a more complicated and complex failure of foreign policy.… Her explanation of American policy towards Arab disputes did not waver from our standing instructions. The United States did not take positions on the merits of such quarrels between Arab nations, although the policy was to, in the strongest terms, urge that the parties to a dispute resolve it diplomatically or through international mediation, and not via military threats or action.” During the meeting, Hussein made clear to Ambassador Glaspie that Iraq had no intention of taking any military action against Kuwait so long as there was an ongoing negotiating process. He tells Egyptian President Hosni Mubarak the same thing (see July 25, 1990). In later years, Iraqi officials such as Aziz and then-Undersecretary of Foreign Affairs Nizar Hamdun will acknowledge that Glaspie did nothing more than reiterate the main points of US policy towards Iraq to Hussein. Wilson, a friend of Hamdun’s, will recall his last conversation with Hamdun before his death in July 2003, where the ailing Hamdun confirmed that, in Wilson’s words, “The Iraqi leadership had not come away thinking she had tacitly indicated that the US condoned the use of force. On the contrary, [Hussein] knew exactly what the American position was—opposition to Iraqi military action, under any and all circumstances.” [WILSON, 2004, PP. 99-101]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, Joseph C. Wilson, Nizar Hamdun, April Glaspie, Hosni Mubarak
Category Tags: Iraq Invasion of Kuwait
Barry Lando. [Source: Master Media Speakers]Author and investigative producer Barry Lando later writes that the entire Iraq-Kuwait dispute may have been manipulated to some extent by the UUS, with the meeting between US Ambassador April Glaspie and Iraq’s Saddam Hussein (see July 25, 1990) a centerpiece of the operation. In February 2007, Lando will say, “After Iraq’s war with Iran ended, the Kuwaitis manipulated the world oil price through their production—they greatly increased their oil production, which dropped the world oil price (seeMay 28-30, 1990 and Mid-1990). That really hurt Iraq, because Saddam was counting on oil revenues to rebuild after the war. He went to the Kuwaitis and he said, look, back off because you’re killing my economy. The Kuwaitis refused to back down. Later it came out that the Kuwaiti’s leaders had been meeting with the CIA exactly to put pressure on Saddam Hussein. [Glaspie] told Saddam Hussein that we will not take any position as far as your border disputes with Kuwait go. Her superior, Assistant Secretary of State John Kelly, also testified before Congress a couple of days later (see July 31, 1990). When asked point blank, ‘If Saddam invades Kuwait, do we have any treaty with Kuwait?’ he said, ‘No, we don’t.’” [BUZZFLASH (.COM), 2/23/2007]
Entity Tags: Saddam Hussein, April Glaspie, Barry Lando, Central Intelligence Agency,John Kelly
Category Tags: Iraq Invasion of Kuwait
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