Previously, in 1963, during a meeting of the Czechoslovak Defence Council when
money-laundering was being discussed, the Chief of the General Staff had stated that the
Soviets had decided that
officials
in the Soviet finance department should not
be
informed about the precise sources of the funds they were handling because there was too great a risk of compromise. At risk, the Soviet adviser had explained, were people in seventy-five
percent of the banks in Latin America and in forty-five percent
of
the banks in the United
States and Canada. When the amount of money involved was considered, around $300 billion
per year in the United States in the late 1980s, $500 billion or more per year worldwide, these percentages certainly do not seem high.
Furthermore, in the spring of 1967, General Savinkin, head of the Soviet Administrative Organs Department, convened a meeting
in
Moscow of the top leadership of the Warsaw Pact drug-trafficking countries, plus Cuba. Savinkin chaired the meetings, which continued
for several days. Numerous Soviet military and intelligence generals were present at different times. In addition to Sejna, Josef Kudrna, the Czech Minister of Interior, and General
Bohimir Lomsky, the Minister of Defence, were present. Four Cubans attended the meeting: Raul Castro, Cuba's Minister of Interior,
the deputy military intelligence chief in charge of narcotics, and one other. The other countries represented were East Germany, Hungary,
Bulgaria and Poland.
One of the most important topics addressed at this particular meeting was the
importance
of attacking
NATO and US military forces more aggressively
with drugs.
Detailed studies of all NATO forces were presented, and their vulnerabilities
discussed. In his remarks, General Savinkin identified three primary objectives:
To corrupt officers, to
recruit agents and to impair the functioning of troops.
The offensive against US troops based overseas, received special emphasis. Savinkin
explained that areas where US troops were based - Germany, Turkey, Greece, Panama and
so
forth - were, to use a military term, to become zones of strategic destruction. This task was so
important that Soviet Major General Vasil Fedorenko was placed in charge of coordinating
the attack. Each country had a similar coordinator designated, who acted as the primary liaison with Fedorenko. And as will be described shortly, the need to corrupt US forces in NATO received additional
emphasis
in
the fall of 1967. (By 1970, the standard of US
command of forces in NATO had in fact already fallen to
dangerously low levels and was
soon to trigger far-reaching disciplinary measures).
In this operation, Panama received special emphasis
because of the Panama Canal and because of the presence in Panama of several US military
bases. Colonel Frantisek
Penc, of Czechoslovak military intelligence, was in charge of the Czechoslovak operation in Panama. He was also the liaison to Fedorenko for drug-trafficking against US bases in other regions of the world.
At one of the special sessions focused on
Latin America, General Shevchenko, head of
the Department of Special Propaganda [see page 65], explained that the Soviets believed that
over seventy percent of the top-level Panamanian military (Lt. Colonel and above) were
anti-American. A list of these officers had been drawn up with the assistance of the
Communist Party of Panama. They had all operated with
the Communist Party
and some
had contributed money to the Party. The officers were not targets to be destroyed, General
Shevchenko emphasised,
but to be protected because some of them were our 'Gold Reserve'. Many, if not most, of them were involved with drugs. One of the Panamanian
military officers on the list was Omar Torrijos Herrera, who was to seize control of Panama
in
1969. Raul Castro said that Cuba believed that anti-American sentiments were even
stronger among lower level officers, and that the Cubans would like to focus more attention on recruiting lower level officers. The Soviets concurred with this proposal.
By 1972, Panama had developed such a severe drug problem that special measures were discussed at the US Bureau of Narcotics and Dangerous Drugs [BNDD, subse-quently
absorbed into the DEA]. In an attack on Noriega in 1986, the New York Times published a
detailed account of these anxieties. John E. Ingersoll, who was then head of the Bureau of
National Dangerous Drugs, confirmed that BNDD had hard intelligence that
Noriega was
trafficking in drugs - adding that the BNDD had been frustrated in its attempts to persuade
General Torrijos to take action against Noriega. According to a 1978 Senate Intelligence
Committee report, five measures had been discussed to deal with the 'Guardia
National official', which was the Committee's description of Noriega: Link Noriega to a fictitious plot against Torrijos, leak information on Noriega's drug-trafficking to the press, link negotiations over the Panama Canal to Noriega's removal, secretly encourage powerful groups in Panama to raise the issue, and 'total and complete immobilisation', which was
of
course an euphemism for assassination4.
Colombia was another country which the Moscow meeting held in the spring of 1967 discussed in detail. With respect to Colombia, Raul recommended that Cuba should develop
more than one group to control drug-trafficking. (At that time, there were two Soviet- controlled operations: the Cuban operation and the Czechoslovak operation). Savinkin
pointed out that the number of groups should be kept to a minimum. The more groups there
were, the more people there would be in the know, and the greater was the risk of exposure. He was referring to exposure of the Soviet operation*. Castro agreed,
but said the risk was also high with just one group because of the internal politics involved. Savinkin approved
Castro's recommendation and emphasised that it was the Cubans' responsibility
and he
would trust their judgment in this matter - but that Havana should be careful not to go too far.
Raul also raised the question of how much the Communist Party of Colombia should be told and presented a long
list of people
corrupted by the drug
trade in Colombia
which
had been assembled by Cuban intelligence agents who had infiltrated the indigenous
Colombian drug-trafficking networks. The Soviets were concerned about some of the names on the list whom they believed to be among various 'double agents' whom the
indigenous drug-trafficking organisations had corrupted and
were
using against the Soviet-Cuban drug operation. Savinkin said that these people were all criminals. They don't trust anybody except themselves,
he
explained. We are in the same position and cannot trust any of them, either.
In his review of Mexico, Savinkin said that there were no corrections
to
be made in
respect to the corruption of Mexican political officials. For all practical purposes, they had all
been corrupted. The next priority was to work on the Mexican business elite.
There were also discussions about the networks into Western Europe. The principal
distribution outlets into the European market were Switzerland, Austria (Vienna) and
* Editor's Note: This revealing admission
of
the obvious - that exposure must be avoided at all costs - points the way for serious
Western observers and for all who are determined, even at this late stage, to confront the drug offensive
against civilisation. The one
hazard that the perpetrators fear is, precisely, exposure. Hence the present
work, intended
by the Author to expose this long-term act of war against humanity. Note also that Savinkin was concerned about the Soviet drug programme being exposed, not
so much the ultimately expendable ones of the
satellites, which existed in part to provide Moscow with a veneer of deniability.
Sweden (Stockholm). All the Soviet Bloc intelligence services operated in these regions,
which served as centres for drug distribution and for the covert transfer of stolen technology
to
the Soviet Bloc. (Panama was also to become a centre for these two activities). Intelligence linkages into other
countries favoured certain national intelligence services; for example, the Germans were particularly active in marketing drugs through the Netherlands.
Another topic discussed
was the increased use of drugs to corrupt
the elite classes
in Third World countries. Bulgarian officials said that Turkey and Iran had posed no prob- lem. They had destroyed themselves. Savinkin criticised this remark and told the Bulgarians to listen more carefully - he was referring to the elite class. They must improve the quality
of
drugs and push their use into the upper classes.
In 1967, the head of the Health Administration
briefed the Czechoslovak Defence Council on seven or eight new drugs which had been developed in the course of their drug
research and development program. The research activity had been started five years earlier, in a facility constructed next to
the Central Military Hospital in Prague specifically for the development of chemical and biological warfare agents, mind-control
drugs,
assassination weapons, and more effective narcotics.
The drugs reviewed in 1967 were a product of this program. They had been devel-
oped by scientists and medical doctors from the Central Military Hospital and the Air
Force Scientific Centre and tested on prisoners. The new drugs were considered more
effective because
their immediate effects were longer lasting, and, as
a bonus, they caused
long-term damage in the capacity of humans to think logically. Sejna was particularly impressed with one of the more effective drugs that left the user optimistic and put
him in
a 'no worries, don't care' frame of mind. When tested on prisoners, the prisoners
became
unconcerned
about penalties or having to spend their whole lives in jail. The longer-term effects, tested after two to three years, were residual mental attitudes
of passivity and res- ignation. The test subjects did not even try to make intelligent decisions. Evidently, the
drug attacked the centre of motivation.
At the briefing, the Czechoslovak
doctors recommended three drugs that they
believed would be the drugs of the future. The Soviet adviser, who also attended the meeting, said the drugs should not be marketed then because they might cause questions to be asked. At that time, the Soviets believed that the blame for the drug epidemic, as desired, had been successfully placed on organised crime. If we put new drugs on the market, the
Soviets reasoned, people in the West might become suspicious. We need to
be
very careful
to
wait until the correct time; for example, when there are other potential co-producers who can be blamed as the source for the new drugs.
Another especially
interesting new dimension arose in September 1967, in connection
with a visit by Raul Castro to Czechoslovakia. This event was the annual develop ment and approval of the next one-year plan. Accompanying Castro were several high-level Cuban officials: the Chief of Military Intelligence, Chief of the Military Medical Administration, Deputy Head of the Administrative Organs Department, Deputy Chief
of the General Staff for Armaments and Technology, and the Deputy Chief of the Main
Political
Administration. As in the past, Sejna was the Czechoslovak official who hosted the
entourage.
The principal subject of the meeting was the drug and narcotics operation.
A sizeable expansion
of
Cuban and Soviet Bloc drug and narcotics trafficking activity was agreed. At this meeting, too, a protocol was signed which enabled Cuban scientists (seventeen or eighteen of them) to assist joint Soviet Bloc research teams work-
ing on drugs and narcotics. Henceforth the Cuban scientists would be working with Czechoslovak scientists, but not with the other Soviet Bloc teams. This was an indirect way of bringing the Cubans into the Soviet Bloc program.
One of the principal areas in which the Cuban scientists had been conducting
research and one that they would be working on in cooperation with other Warsaw Pact scientists was an analysis of the influence of drugs on the 'intellectual stagnation' of society. The idea was that drugs would inhibit the development of the mind (intellect) and this would in
turn help to bring about a stagnation
of
bourgeois society. The questions of interest involved what drugs or combinations of drugs were most effective in crippling the mind
and how many drugs, over how many years, were required to cripple a society. That is,
what drug-trafficking was required to achieve the desired effect?
This was part of a highly important Soviet operation; and all the Soviet Bloc countries had programs underway to develop the best drugs and accompanying analyses.
Czechoslovakia, East Germany, Bulgaria, Hungary and the Soviet Union itself were heavily
involved. The crippling of bourgeois society was the 'main order'.
The efficacy
of
this strategy
could only be appreciated in the West after the event, since the long-term debilitating effects of nearly all drugs on the brain, even (indeed,
espe-
cially) including those of marijuana, have since become better known and gained publicity and recognition. One factor of special relevance that
is
now recognised is the neurological effect on infants born to women on marijuana or cocaine, including long-term behavioural
impairment and learning disabilities5.
Castro was particularly forceful in presenting his position to Czechoslovak and Soviet
officials. He argued that it was important to push this aspect of drug-trafficking operations even harder, and to advance the onset of stagnation by targeting younger students, specifi-
cally, high school students and children6. The Soviets were thinking in terms of forty to
fifty
years to bring about the desired results. Castro believed they could be accomplished in thirty-
five years7. The Soviets were more conservative because of the social
changes they believed
would have to be achieved in parallel, and because they had coordinated these changes with other events in their long-range plan to destroy the West.
The Soviets were also concerned that pushing drugs on high school students and
children might be too radical
and cause an undesirable counter-reaction. In their
plan, the Soviet-preferred
bourgeois targets were the technical elite, intellectuals, soldiers and
college students.
Following the meeting between Cuban and Czechoslovak officials in Prague described above, a Czechoslovak
delegation went to Havana to work out details for the
participation of Cuban scientists in the joint studies,
to
explore the possibility of including
even more than seventeen scientists, and to determine if it would be possible through Castro to recruit more 'progressive' scientists throughout Latin America to assist (unwit-
tingly) in analysing the impact of drugs on society.
The delegation was headed
by General
Oldrich Burda, Chief of the Zs. Accompanying
him were the deputy chief of the Health Administration, the chief of research at the main military hospital (his speciality being neurology), and the deputy head of the Department of Science.
Castro also believed that more emphasis
in
Latin America
should be placed on cor- rupting and recruiting the military. This was necessary in order to push the revolutionary
movement forward, he argued; the politicians were already thoroughly corrupted. By 1988,
resources throughout Latin America were reporting the heavy involvement of military
officers and police officials in drug-trafficking. This was particularly true in Colom-
bia, its neighbours, and in Panama, Honduras and Mexico8.
Additionally, by 1967 the Cuban campaign to penetrate the 'independent' Latin
American drug operations was nearing completion. Cuban intelligence now
estimated
that ninety percent of the targeted organisations
had already been penetrated and Castro
argued that the time had come to destroy the Latin American drug groups which still resisted penetration and were 'uncooperative'.
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