Pages
Monday, March 1, 2010
The end of the eschaton and the watching that Jesus Christ commanded
St. Isidore -- The Third Age of the World and The Fourth Age of the World
St. Isidore -- The Fifth Age of the World and Sixth Age until St. John
St. Isidore -- The Sixth age of the World until St. Ambrose
St. Isidore -- The Sixth Age of the World until 616 A.D.
The Great Apostasy Prophesied by the Lord Jesus Christ
The Great Tribulation and the End of this Age
Prophecy of Christ
The Punishments Of The Apostates In The Future
What is the watching that Jesus said.
Memories of a dam, a high dam…

780 × 519 - Memories of a dam, a high dam… Afbeelding Photographed by: Hafez Diab
egypte.xsbb.nl
The story of the High Dam was a tale of a nation, hikayit sha‘b, as Abdel Halim Hafiz chanted in an iconic song from the Nasserist period.
This nation lived under the yoke of British colonialism for over 70 years. After gaining independence, Egypt's revolutionary president, Colonel Gamal Abdel Nasser, approached the World Bank to finance the construction of a dam on the Nile, a vital step towards economic development. The World Bank refused. In an audacious challenge to old and new imperialism, Nasser nationalized the Suez Canal in 1956 to acquire funding for the project. The struggling nation heroically endured subsequent military assaults and a trade embargo. The dam was eventually built.
“We said we would build and here we have built the high dam. Oh colonialism, we have built it with our hands, the high dam. With our money, with the hands of our workers,” Abdel Halim’s chorus enthusiastically repeated. Like this, the socialist dream began, only to fall apart, leaving behind memories of a vanished era.
The story of the High Dam at Aswan is indeed the tale of this nation. The stages of its history chronicle critical transformations in Egyptian history at large. During the last half century, the dam moved from being a celebrated monument to Egyptian independence to a forgotten barrage deep in the country's south. It was a state-engineered tool of anti-imperialist propaganda, whose splendor faded away with the downfall and fundamental reversion of the anti-imperial project.
When the dam was built, it was high--as high as the proud head of a newly independent nation. Nasser’s Arab socialism was born out of the construction of this dam during the 1960s. When the US refused to fund it, the Soviet Union stepped in to offer not only a loan, but also experts and equipment. It was the tensest years of the Cold War, and Nasser’s decision to side with the communist camp was declared.
Egypt's state of development at the time necessitated such a dam to control Nile flooding in order to develop agriculture and to generate electricity for the dream of heavy industrialization. In Nasser’s propaganda, the High Dam became the symbol of the end of decades of economic dependency. As the thrilling news of the dam filled newspapers and public television everyday throughout its years of construction, the populist government was spreading free university education, distributing land deeds to peasants, erecting public sector factories, granting rights to workers, expanding freedoms to women, and much more.
Nasser did not live to see the dam completed and President Anwar el-Sadat opened its gates in 1971. Nasser had died a year earlier in the wake of a humiliating defeat in the 1967 war with Israel. During the opening ceremony, Sadat and the president of the Soviet Union also unveiled a sculpture nearby commemorating “Egyptian-Soviet Friendship.”
Only a year later, Sadat expelled the Soviet experts from Egypt and decided to switch Cold War camps, forming a strategic alliance with the United States and reversing Nasser’s socialism by liberalizing the economy and introducing the “open door” policy. After years of patiently waiting for its completion, the High Dam, all of sudden, seemed unimportant. If the state was withdrawing from the economy, privatizing state-owned factories, and returning agricultural land to the old aristocracy, then it no longer needed to sing for a dam.
Over the course of the following the 1970s, the news of the dam gradually disappeared from national papers and television, only to be replaced with stories of imported consumer goods, private business tycoons, and a peace treaty with Israel. During the 1990s, news of the World Bank and International Monetary Fund's introduction of market economy reforms and neoliberal developments dominated Egyptian media and almost nobody heard about the poor dam.
A pronounced cultural narrative developed around the High Dam during its construction and into the post-Nasserist era. Songs, movies, poetry, and fiction all recorded in meticulous detail narratives of a nearly mythical entity on the southern Nile that would supposedly alter the fate of all social classes in the nation. Abdel Halim Hafez was not simply another nationalist singer who cheerfully chanted for the dam in 1960. His voice symbolizes the Nasserist period, with its victories and defeats, and echoes a generation of romantic idealists--mostly educated and middle-class—whose slogans of progress and global equality were quickly smashed.
The famous movie of el-Haqiqa el-‘Ariya (The Naked Truth), produced in 1963 and starring the legendary couple Magda and Ehaab Nafi, was far from a simple love story between an engineer in the dam and a pretty tour guide in the ancient sites of Nubia. The protagonist, a middle-class, educated woman, took a group of tourists to Aswan to show them Pharaonic temples and the dam, only to find true love there. At first the handsome engineer resented her career ambitions, but he eventually gave in. In the shadow of the dam, a man realized the importance of women’s rights, and a woman was liberated.
In his famous poems "Letters of Hiraji el-Qutt to his Wife Fatima," Abdel Rahman el-Abnudi told another story of workers receiving their liberation through the construction of the dam. These poems narrated the story of a poor Upper Egyptian laborer whose journey to work for the dam transformed him from an illiterate peasant into a skilled worker enjoying political awareness. The poems, which were publicly recited in 1969, recounted how Hiraji took the train from his small village to Aswan, leaving behind his wife Fatima, and their two children. In his letters to Fatima, the worker sent not only money that bettered his family’s life and educated his son, but also passionately notes about how the dam taught him new things and created a new person out of him every day. Hiraji was at first sad to be away from his village, but an enlightened engineer told him about the war Egypt fought for the dam, and taught him how to work machines. “The dam, Fatima, opened my eyes for the world, as if it took me out of a hole into light,” Hiraji asserted.
All this was a part of conspicuous state propaganda program, as many opposition groups came to realize. After Nasser died, Sonallah Ibrahim, then a young communist, wrote a novel undermining the myth after a visit to Aswan. Nasser’s totalitarian, one-party regime had jailed Ibrahim and his fellow dissidents for years. Ibrahim’s novel Najmat Aghustus (The August Star), published in 1974, depicted a building project where inhumane conditions and workers’ repression prevailed. It was hot in the deep south, under the burning sun of August, and it was no place for liberties or anti-imperialist fantasies. He compared Nasser to Pharaoh Ramses II who built Abu Simbel Temple— allegorically insisting that both of them constructed colossal monuments to glorify their despotism.
A visit to Aswan today would bring about another set of bitter memories. It is most likely when you take a taxi there that the driver will be a Nubian, and he will be playing a tape of sad folk songs of the “old country." The old country, or el-balad el-gadima, is the villages of old Nubia whose inhabitants were forcibly relocated to create space for the dam’s reservoir. These internal refugees were given spacious new houses, land, and cattle, but in dry deserts far from the green paradise where they once lived.
Other sorts of odd memories still linger in the city. Ordinary women go to what they call sug el-rus, “the market of Russians,” which is probably where the Soviet workers on the dam shopped for their groceries. Remnants of Nasserist engineers, lawyers, and aging workers are still Aswan, inciting political activism in a city remote from the central government.
Fifty years have passed since the onset of the dam’s dream, and many believe that Western imperialism is already back in Egypt with US economic domination. The High Dam no longer looks so high. What remains of it is a field trip that school children take for a drive on the body of the barrage and a visit to the “Egyptian-Soviet Friendship” monument. Magda and Ehab Nafi's movie “The Naked Truth” is still pointlessly, yet routinely, shown on state television. And occasionally the enthusiastic voice of Abdel Halim chants amid women's ululations, “Oh colonialism, we have built it with our hands, the high dam.”
Huge head of Tutankhamun's grandfather unearthed in Egypt
Huge head of Tutankhamun's grandfather unearthed in Egypt
By Hadeel Al-ShalchiThe newly unearthed 3400-year-old red granite head, part of a huge statue of the ancient pharaoh Amenhotep III, is seen at the pharaoh's mortuary temple in the city of Luxor, Egypt. Photo / AP
The newly unearthed 3400-year-old red granite head, part of a huge statue of the ancient pharaoh Amenhotep III, is seen at the pharaoh's mortuary temple in the city of Luxor, Egypt. Photo / AP
CAIRO - Archaeologists have unearthed a massive red granite head of one Egypt's most famous pharaohs who ruled nearly 3400 years ago, the Egyptian Supreme Council of Antiquities announced yesterday.
The head of Amenhotep III, which alone is about the height of a person, was dug out of the ruins of the pharaoh's mortuary temple in the southern city of Luxor.
The leader of the expedition that discovered the head described it as the best preserved sculpture of Amenhotep III's face found to date.
"Other statues have always had something broken: the tip of the nose, the face is eroded," said Dr Hourig Sourouzian, who has led the led the Egyptian-European expedition at the site since 1999.
"But here, from the tip of the crown to the chin, it is so beautifully carved and polished, nothing is broken."
The head is part of a larger statue found several years ago, along with the parts of the body, the back slab, and the ceremonial beard which Souruzian says will soon be connected with the head.
Sourouzian said the pharaoh was famous for leading Egypt at the peak of its ancient civilisation, when peace and luxury were prevalent throughout the kingdom.
Craftsmen were also honing their artistic techniques during the period, which may explain the symmetrical features of the unearthed head.
"But he may have looked exactly as this statue and he may have been a very beautiful, very handsome man," Sourouzian told the Associated Press.
Amenhotep III's massive mortuary temple was largely destroyed, possibly by floods, and little remains of its walls.
The expedition, however, has unearthed a wealth of artifacts and statuary in the buried ruins, including two statues of Amenhotep made of black granite found in March.
- AP
By Hadeel Al-ShalchiUnited States Country Studies
Country Studies
POLITICAL DYNAMICS
POLITICAL DYNAMICS
Syria Table of Contents BackgroundAfter independence in 1946, Syrian leaders established a parliamentary democracy, which failed because politics remained centered on personalities and because factional, sectarian, and tribal rivalries persisted. Such a situation was not conducive to domestic unity, much less to national consensus or political momentum. The multiparty political system gave way to a series of military dictatorships, then to Syria's subordination to Egypt in the short-lived United Arab Republic (UAR) from February 1958 to September 1961. Since 1963, when the Baath Party came to full power in Syria, political competition has evolved and shifted within the party. Under the party, the role of the military has been especially significant. At independence, power was concentrated in the hands of a wealthy oligarchy of landlords, industrialists, merchants, and lawyers. Most of this aristocracy urban Sunni Muslims who derived their influence from inherited wealth and social position, as well as from their early involvement in the Arab nationalist movement. Their political experience, however, was entirely based on opposition, first to Ottoman Turkey and then to France and Zionism. They had no precedent for a more positive platform of national reconciliation and integration, mass mobilization, and popular welfare. The most prominent political organization in 1946 was the National Bloc, a loose alliance originally formed in 1928 by leading members of landowning families and other well-known individuals. This group was wealthy and well educated, chiefly at French and Turkish universities or at French- and American- operated colleges in Lebanon and Egypt. Their priority was eliminating the French while maintaining their personal power. They had little contact with the masses and did not seek to bridge the traditional gap separating the upper classes from the rest of society. Of the various political parties forming Syria, two had risen to prominence by mid-1947: the National Party and the People's Party. The National Party, which dominated the government until 1949, represented the industrialists of Damascus, leading businessmen, and prominent landlords. It was dedicated to continuing the power of men who had long worked together not only for independence but against union with Jordan and Iraq. Until 1949 the People's Party was the principal opposition. It represented the interests of the merchants and landlords of Aleppo against domination by Damascus. The party had a strong interest in agricultural issues--in contrast to the National Party's focus on industry--and close ties with Iraq, with which many of the members had strong commercial and trade relationships. The two parties therefore embodied the major traditional political divisions within Syria: the rivalry between Aleppo and Damascus and that between those who favored unity with the Levant (Palestine, Lebanon, and Syria) as opposed to those who favored unity with the Fertile Crescent (Iraq, Jordan and Syria). Along with these parties, a new party was evolving. The Baath Party can be traced to 1940, when two Damascene secondary schoolteachers, Michel Aflaq and Salah ad Din al Bitar, were inspired by the Arab renaissance movement. In 1943 the term Baath (meaning resurrection) became associated with the movement, and in 1944 the movement was transformed into a party. In April 1947, the Baath Party held its first congress, which was attended by around 250 members. Most were Syrians, but Jordanian, Lebanese, and Iraqi students in Syrian schools were also present. Most of the original members were students, teachers, professionals, and public employees--the kernel of Syria's emerging new middle class. The congress elected Aflaq, the party's philosopher and ideologue, as "dean," the equivalent of secretary general. Bitar became the organizational and administrative leader. In 1947 the Baath Party was a marginal political force. It was organizationally weak and unprepared to assert itself effectively. Gradually, it broadened its constituency beyond the narrow circle of students and intellectuals to include the urban lower middle class, which was attracted to the party's proposed program of social and economic reform. At the same time, the party's unflagging emphasis on Arab nationalism evoked considerable support from the military's officer corps. The constitution adopted by the Baath founding congress of 1947 extolled the motto of "Unity, Freedom, and Socialism" as an integrated concept, in which no one element could be attained without the other two. Of the three, however, Arab unity was considered first among equals as the primary catalyst of Arab resurrection. Socialism was not an end in itself but a means to achieve the higher ends of freedom, unity, and socioeconomic justice. Aflaq rejected a doctrinaire definition of socialism. He maintained that his socialism aimed at more than merely equalizing wealth and providing food, shelter, and clothing; instead, it aimed at the higher goal of freeing an individual's talents and abilities. This higher goal was to be attained not through evolution but revolution, which he described as a "violent wrenching away" and an awakening and self-purification. Baath dogma exalted the individual, who was to be free in action, thought, and opportunity in a democratic, parliamentary, constitutional state. The doctrine of a single, indivisible Arab nation was central to Baathist ideology, and statehood was regarded as parochial, negative, and doomed to failure. Baathist doctrine condemned colonialist imperialism, which was and is held to include Zionism, negativism, restrictive state nationalism, sectarianism, and racial and ethnic prejudice. The Arab superstate envisioned by the Baathists was to be founded on a secular, rather than Islamic, framework. However, Christians and other religious minorities were admonished to regard Islam as a "beloved cultural heritage." Furthermore, religious life and values were to endure in an atmosphere of religious toleration. In foreign policy, the party advocated nonalignment with the superpowers and espoused neutrality. Aflaq and Bitar were impressed by Marxist visions of a utopian society free of exploitation but were not won over to communism, which they regarded as subservient to Soviet interests and therefore detrimental to Arab national self-determination. In 1949 popular dissatisfaction with the performance of the conservative ruling elite reached a peak, giving the Baath Party an opportunity to play a more prominent role in Syrian politics. Army officers were angered by what they perceived as civilian bungling of the 1948 Arab-Israeli War. This anger paved the way for Brigadier General Husni az Zaim to stage Syria's first army coup d'état, an event that presaged the rise of the military as the controlling force in Syrian politics. The bloodless takeover, which was widely applauded by the press, opposition politicians, and much of the public, marked the permanent transfer of political power from the traditional landowning elite to a new coalition of young intellectuals, army officers, and the small but growing middle class. The Baath Party welcomed the coup and hoped the Zaim regime would stamp out the government's endemic corruption and usher in parliamentary politics. However, the Zaim government did not bring stability. Rather, four more military coups were staged prior to Syria's unification with Egypt in 1958. Beneath the facade of dictatorial rule, proliferating Syrian political parties were locked in chaotic competition with the Baath Party for dominance of Syrian politics. Partisan rivalry was particularly intense for the allegiance of the armed forces, which party organizers realized would control the government. The conservative National Party and People's Party waned in influence, while the semifascist Syrian Socialist Nationalist Party (SSNP), founded in 1933 by a Lebanese Christian, Antun Saadeh, gained numerous adherents. The SSNP called for the creation of a "Greater Syria" encompassing Lebanon, Palestine, Jordan, and Cyprus. The Syrian Communist Party (SCP), headed by Khalid Bakdash, was small, but its tight organization and disciplined following gave it far greater importance than its size alone would have merited. Another party, the Arab Socialist Party (ASP), was a serious contender for the allegiance of the middle class. The ASP was founded in 1950 by Akram Hawrani as an outgrowth of the Youth Party he had established in 1939. His doctrine followed closely that of Aflaq and Bitar. Hawrani's followers were drawn mostly from Hamah and Homs; they included teachers, students, urban workers, and numerous associates organized by his relatives. In addition, he cultivated many followers in the armed forces. In early 1953, the ASP merged with the Baath Party, combining the well-developed ideological framework of the Baath Party with Hawrani's grass-roots organizational base. No substantial changes were required in the merger except the insertion of the word socialist (ishtiraki) in the new party's name. Hawrani also found no difficulty in accepting Aflaq's 1947 constitution, which continued in toto as the scripture of Baathism, and the founding year of the Baath Party is still considered 1947. The new Baath Party quickly became a serious challenge to all existing parties. The intense rivalry between the Baath Party and the SSNP climaxed in the April 1955 assassination of Colonel Adnan Malki, the deputy chief of staff and a leading Baathist, by a sergeant in the SSNP. Following the assassination, the SSNP was accused of plotting to overthrow the government, and its leaders either fled the country or were convicted of conspiracy. Consequently, the SSNP disappeared as an effective political force in Syria. In 1957 the Baathists entered into a partnership with their erstwhile adversaries, the Communists, in order to crush the residual power of conservative parties. This left-wing alliance succeeded in eliminating the right wing. However, in the last months of 1957, the Communists and other radicals came to dominate the left-wing alliance, while the Baath Party's power eroded. Fearing the Communists' growing power, the Baath Party drafted a bill in December 1957 for union between Syria and Egypt. Because Arab unity is a sacred aspiration, the Baathists knew that neither the Communists nor any other politicians could openly oppose it. In February 1958, Syria joined Egypt to form the UAR. The Baath Party realized that President Gamal Abdul Nasser's declared hostility to political parties would mean the end of its legal existence but gambled that the communist movement, which was being ruthlessly persecuted in Egypt at the time, would be damaged disproportionately. The Baathists were partially correct. Hawrani, titular head of the Baath Party, was appointed vice president of the new republic. However, all real power resided in Nasser's hands, and Syria was governed as a virtual colony of Egypt. On September 28, 1961, a military coup took Syria out of the UAR, and in December 1961, a general election for the constituent assembly was held; Communists and Nasserites were banned from running for office. Although a few Baathists were elected, the majority of the new assembly consisted of members of the conservative People's Party and National Party. People's Party leader Nazim al Qudsi was elected president. From 1961 to 1963, Syria was in a state of near anarchy. Coups and countercoups, street fighting between Nasserites, Communists, and Baathists, and battles between rival army factions plunged the nation into chaos. Early in 1963, a group of senior officers conspired to stage yet another coup. To build their alliance within the military, they joined forces with a group of Baathist majors and lieutenant colonels, who turned out to be more formidable than they or anyone else realized. The original group of officers had been transferred to Egypt during the union as a form of internal exile because of their suspected opposition to the UAR. Irritated at Egyptian dominance of the union, they organized the secret Military Committee, which was dedicated to seizing power. They deviated from the Baath Party's pan-Arabism in championing Syrian nationalism. Having grown up for the most part in relatively poor rural areas of Syria, these men strongly advocated land reform and other socialist measures. Most of the committee belonged to minority groups. For example, the original core of conspirators consisted of three Alawis and two Ismailis. Later, the Military Committee was enlarged to include fifteen members. Only six of these members were Sunni Muslims; the remainder consisted of five Alawis, two Druzes, and two Ismailis. The coup, subsequently called the Baath Revolution, occurred on March 8, 1963. Baath Party cofounder Bitar was installed as prime minister, and, within several months, the Baathists had maneuvered their non-Baathist associates out of power. The Baath, Party, especially its military component and its "Regional Command as opposed to its National Command, has dominated Syria since. Although the Baath Revolution was bracketed chronologically by prior and subsequent coups, countercoups, and power struggles, it was far more than another convulsion in the body politic. Rather, it marked a crucial turning point in Syria's postindependence history. Because of the coup, the focus of Syrian politics shifted markedly to the left, where it has remained since. However, just as the Baath Party became ascendant, the military officers who had commandeered it as a vehicle for their own rise to power abandoned its original egalitarian ideology by establishing a military dictatorship. In 1966 the party's cofounders, Aflaq and Bitar, were expelled from the party and exiled from Syria. Bitar, in an interview conducted several weeks before he was assassinated in Paris in July 1980, reportedly at the hands of Syrian intelligence, said "The major deviation of the Baath is having renounced democracy . . . the two real bases of the regime are dictatorship and confessionalism. The Baath Party, as a party, does not exist." Assad's November 1970 takeover of Syria in a bloodless coup--the Corrective Movement--cemented Baath Party dominance in Syrian politics. Yet, as Assad created the political institutions through which he would rule, he sought to liberalize the political situation, albeit within carefully circumscribed limits, to diversify support for his new regime. For example, in February 1971 he established the People's Council as an appointed deliberative body; following adoption of the Permanent Constitution in 1973, it became an elected body. In 1972 Assad instituted a multiparty system by creating the National Progressive Front (NPF), a coalition of the Baath Party, the SCP, and three small left-wing parties--the ASP, the Nasserite Syrian Arab Socialist Union, and the Socialist Union Movement. In 1987 this coalition continued to govern Syria with its seventeen-member Central Command, which coordinated the activities of the five parties. Although the Baath Party was unquestionably the dominant party in the coalition, and the other parties were nearly invisible, Syria remained one of the few Arab nations with multiple legal political parties. In 1978 Assad pledged to implement a "new formula" that would rehabilitate and incorporate some of the old conservative political parties from the pre-Baath regime under the NPF umbrella. Although the new formula was never implemented because Syria was beset with internal security problems, in 1987 the NPF retained an open-ended framework that could expand to include diverse elements. Assad appeared committed to broadening his regime's support, so long as broadening did not diminish his power. The Baath Party Apparatus More about the Government of Syria. |